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TRANSFER OF JURISDICTION IN JUVENILE COURT: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE PROCEEDING, ITS ROLE IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, AND A PROPOSAL
FOR THE REFORM OF KENTUCKY LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
This article is not another generic meditation on the evolution

and prospects of the juvenile court movement. After almost threequarters of a century,' it should be common knowledge, especially
among judges and lawyers, that juvenile courts exist because
every legislature in the country has seen fit to institutionalize
the societal consensus that children who run afoul of the law
should be treated differently than adults and given an opportunity to be helped and rehabilitated rather than abandoned to
the retributive social machinery of the adult criminal justice
system. 2 This longstanding philosophy of the juvenile court move-

ment has been articulated by the Kentucky Court of Appeals on
1 Kentucky enacted its first juvenile code in 1906, Ky. ACTs ch. 64 [1906], and
modeled its statute after an earlier law passed by Illinois in 1899.
2Some years ago Judge Orman Ketcham elaborated a mutual compact theory
of juvenile
justice
andheld
the mutuality
compact to have been predicated
upon
the five
following
guarantees
made of
by the
the state to the child: (1) hearings
would be promptly held, easily understood, fair and compatible with, if not part
of, the treatment process; (2) if the child was found to be an offender against
society, there would be no stigma attached to the finding or any record which
could be considered criminal in nature; (3) an attempt would be made to
strengthen family ties and the child would be removed from the home only when
the welfare of the child or the interests of the community demanded such action;
(4) if indicated by the findings of the hearing, the child's subsequent treatment,
if not undertaken in the natural home, would as closely as possible approximate
that which should have been given by the natural parents; and (5) when removal
from home and close supervision was required, the destructive effects of imprisonment upon habits, attitudes, and aspirations would be minimized by therapeutically
oriented restrictions. In return for these assurances, the child and his parent gave
up certain constitutional rights to due process of law. It was because of a failure
by the state to live up to the demands of the compact that the United States
Supreme Court redefined and restored these constitutional rights to children during
the late 1960's and early 1970's. Ketcham, The Changing Philosophy of the
Juvenile Justice System, 20 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 59 (1969).
a Baker v. Smith, 477 S.W.2d 149 (Ky. 1972); Young v. Knight, 329 S.W.2d
195 (Ky. 1959); Robinson v. Kieren, 216 S.W.2d 925 (Ky. 1949); Mattingly v.
Commonwealth, 188 S.W. 370 (Ky. 1916); Washington v. Commonwealth, 136
S.W. 1041 (Ky. 1911); and Marlow v. Commonwealth, 133 S.W. 1137 (Ky. 1911).
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more than one occasion, 3 and the General Assembly has, over the
years, found it to be so consistent with the public interest that
it has enacted numerous juvenile court laws which have developed into the present Chapter 208 of the Kentucky Revised
4
Statutes [hereinafter cited as KRS].
The depth of commitment to this philosophy has always been
open to some question, however, because from the time of the
enactment of its first juvenile code in 1906,1 Kentucky, like nearly
every other state, has included a provision which makes it possible
4 All of this has not been sufficient, however, to achieve a widespread understanding and proper administration of these laws. This is largely due to the tradition of informality, the principle of confidentiality regarding juvenile court
proceedings, and, up until very recently an overwhelming absence of attorneys
in the courts which gave rise to te attendant random procedures and
infrequent appeals which accompany such a dearth of adversary presence. These
unique aspects of juvenile justice seem to have seriously curtailed the education
of public officials and private citizens alike regarding the juvenile court experiment.
Its very structure has long isolated it from public scrutiny and judicial or legislative
attention. This is not to say that a great deal of good has not been done by the
courts or that many children have not been saved who might otherwise have been
lost to careers of criminal enterprise. The modern preoccupation with the defects
of the juvenile justice system has too often overlooked the long list of achievements
for which this solitary and experimental forum of individualized justice must be
given credit. There remains, however, much that is haphazard and whimsical about
juvenile court processes. This capricious circumstance persists even after the
Supreme Court pronouncements which preciptated the modern juvenile court
revolution, and it seems to stem from a misunderstanding of the essence of
juvenile court philosophy and a misapplication of the means which must be
employed in the attempt to attain the goals envisioned by the founders of the
juvenile court movement. These issues, and the ways in which Kentucky is trying
to meet them, are discussed in an article and book which will be available in
late summer, 1973, Stamm, Child Advocacy and Legislative Reform in Kentucky,
24 Juv. JusTrcE 3 (1978), and M. STAMM, LAw AND CrLi ADvoCAcY iN KENTUCKY JUVENLE COURTS (1973), through the Kentucky Department for Human Re-

sources. These problems are also examined in Allen, The Juvenile Court and the
Limits of Justice, 11 WAYNE L. REv. 676, 680 (1965); Bazelon, Racism, Classism
and the Juvenile Process, 53 J. Am. Jun. Soc'Y 373 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bazelon] and Ferguson, Some Kangaroo Aspects of our Juvenile Courts, 45 CAL. ST. B.J.
85 (1970). Judge Bazelon observes that there has been too much concern for procedure, while treatment and rehabilitation, the substance of juvenile justice, have gone
and Winship
unattended. This has been caused by an overreaction to the Kent, Cault,
decisions,
infra, which place certain procedural restrictions
juvenile
courts.
decisionsupon
which
p reserve
the
Many have overlooked the imnportant parts of those
r
patriae elements and tradition of the court precisely because they are the
bases fortreatment and rehabilitation which make juvenile courts unique forums of
justice. This uniqueness will he preserved, however, only if there is the care, treatment, and rehabilitation intended by juvenile court legislation in this country. Procedural due process will not preserve it because, inthan
the absence
good of
rehabilitative
substance.
devoid
a form of

programs, the juvenile court will be little more
See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 534, 548 (1971); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 366-67 (1970); In re Calt, 387 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1967); and Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). The same problems and misunderstandiny
t
l
also seem to persist in Canada. Parker, Transfer f Juvenile Cases to Adu
Courts,
48
CAN.
B.
RE
v.
336
(1970).
nsKy. AcTs h. 64 [1906].
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to prosecute children in adult courts.' Lack of adequate guidelines for the application of this provision has resulted in recurrent abuse, if not outright subversion and circumvention, of the
juvenile justice system.7 This problem exists at the expense of
the immeasurable social cost incurred when any child is unnecessarily subjected to the rigors of public criminal prosecution. Judge
Bazelon's cogent observations were directly in point when he said
that:
To brand a child a criminal for life is harsh enough retribution
for almost any offense. But it becomes an all but inconceivable
6 This is currently found in Ky. REv. STAT. § 208.170 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as KRS]. Other state provisions are found at: ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 364 (1958);
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060 (1962); Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-202 (Supp. 1971);
Asu. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-241, 45-242 (1947); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 707
(West 1972); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-19-3(2) (Supp. 1965); CONN. GE.
STAT. REv. § 17-60a (Supp. 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2711 (Supp. 1970);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1553 (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02 (Supp. 1973); GA.
CODE ANN. § 24A-2501 (Supp. 1971); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 571-22 (Supp. 1972);
IDAHO CODE § 16-1806 (Sup.. 1973); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7 (1972); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 9-3214 (Burns Supp. 1972); IowA CODE § 232.72 (1971); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-808 (1972); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:1570 (1968); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2611 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-16 (1973); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 61 (1965); Mic.
Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 764-27,
712A.4 (Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.125 (1971); Miss. CODE ANN. §
7185-15 (1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.071 (Supp. 1972); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 10-603 (Supp. 1971); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-202 (1968); NEv. REv. STAT.
§§ 62-060, 62-080 (1971); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 169:21, as amended 169:21-A
(Supp. 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-15 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-27
(Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-280 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34
(Supp.1972); Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (Page 1968); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 1112 (Supp. 1972); ORE. REv. STAT. § 419.533 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, § 50-325 (Pordon 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 14-1-7, 14-1-7.1 (Supp.
1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1171 (Supp. 1971); S.D. CODE §§ 26-8-22.7, 26-11-4
(Supp. 1972); TENN. CODE AN. § 37-234 (Supp. 1972); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 2338-1 (Vernon 1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-86 (Supp. 1973); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-176, 16.1-176.2, 16.1-177, 16.1-177.1 (Supp. 1973); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 13.04.120-.200 (1972); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-14
(1966); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.18 (West Supp. 1973); Wyo. STAT. ANN §§ 14-101,
14-115.38 (Supp. 1971); 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1969). New York and Vermont repealed their transfer statutes in 1967.
7The Kentucky Department of Child Welfare reports that about two percent of the state's juveni e cases are being transferred to criminal court. If the
figure seems low, it is because the juvenile courts in Kentucky do rely on the
Department to provide rehabilitative services to almost all the children who come
into court. It does not, however, mean that all those who are sent to criminal
court are sent lawfully or even because they cannot be helped by the juvenile court.
Very often it is because they are black, "outsiders", not subject to fine in juvenile
court, or because their cases present so many legal and political issues to the
lower court that it simply transfers jurisdiction to the adult forum which may,
in the end, give the child the same sort of probationary disposition he could have
obtained in the juvenile court. The Bureau of Corrections reports that there
are about 50 children in prison and countless others under its supervision because
of criminal court convictions. This whole situation could be improved considerably by imposing guidelines on the power to transfer children to adult courts.
(Figures obtained from the respective agencies during June, 1973.)
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response when we realize that to brand him may in fact make
him a criminal for life. The stigma of a criminal conviction
may itself be a greater handicap in later life than an entire
misspent youth. More important, casting a youthful offender
to the wolves who prowl adult jails may well dash any hope
that he will mature to be a civilized man. On the other hand,
there is some hope that a youth can be recalled from the wrong
road he has started down-whether by psychiatric help, a
changed environment, proper schooling, or even just attention
and understanding."
The juvenile court system was established to provide these
humanitarian alternatives. Consequently, it is inconceivable that
casual invocation of the processes and sanctions of the criminal
law was intended by the General Assembly when it enacted the
transfer provision. However, this provision has endured with its
substance neither challenged in the Court of Appeals nor altered
by the General Assembly. 9 The critical nature of this provision
and its implications for the intended functions of the rehabilitative
forum of juvenile court and the retributive arena of criminal
8 Bazelon, supra note 4. This hope is predictated on a belief that the child who
is not as yet a completely formed person, and is malleable enough to realize his
mistakes can actively participate in his own rehabilitation, and eventually live a
purposeful and lawful life. Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of
juvenile Process?, 57 GEo. L.J. 848, 853-54 (1969).
9 Although the substance of this provision and the policy considerations underlying its inclusion in the juvenile code are of vital significance they have never
been discussed in Kentucky case law. Of the roughly 73 appellate cases dealing
with delinquent minors, 50 have involved the issue of transfer of jurisdiction and
all 50 have been directed at procedural defects rather than at the substantive
question of whether or not and under what conditions it can be deemed in the
best interests of both the child and society that he be prosecuted in the criminal
court. See Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 479 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1972); Bailey v.
Commonwealth, 468 S.W.2d 304 (Ky. 1971); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 465
S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1971); Koonce v. Commonwealth, 452 S.W.2d 822 (Ky. 1970);
Lowry v. Commonwealth, 424 S.W.2d 841 (Ky. 1968); Smith v. Commonwealth,
412 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1967); Benge v. Commonwealth, 346 S.W.2d 311 (Ky.
1961); Young v. Knight, 329 S.W.2d 195 (Ky. 1960); Heustis v. Sanders, 320
S.W.2d 602 (Ky. 1959); Hensley v. Commonwealth, 280 S.W.2d 540 (Ky. 1955);
Vanhoose v. Commonwealth, 264 S.W.2d 72 (Ky. 1954); Childers v. Commonwealth, 239 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1951)- Gipson v. Commonwealth, 226 S.W.2d 758
(Ky. 1950); Curnutt v. Commonwealth, 224 S.W.2d 170 (Ky. 1949); Robinson v.
Kieren, 216 S.W.2d 925 (Ky. 1949); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 186 S.W.2d 416
(Ky. 1945); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 176 S.W.2d 104 (Ky. 1943); Crawford v.
Commonwealth, 95 S.W.2d 12 (Ky. 1936); Edwards v. Commonwealth, 94
S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1936); Tomlinson v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.2d 376 (Ky. 1935);
Commonwealth v. McIntosh, 78 S.W.2d 320 (Ky. 1935); Wooton v. Commonwealth, 75 S.W.2d 556 (Ky. 1934); Watson v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.2d 39
(Ky. 1933); Grise v. Commonwealth, 53 S.W.2d 362 (Ky. 1932); Carsons v. Com47 S.W.2d 548
monwealth, 47 S.W.2d 997 (Ky. 1931); White v. Commonwealth,
(Continued on next page)
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justice have not been sufficiently analyzed until very recent
times. 10 It is one of those things which has always been done

according to "tradition," and little question has been raised about
Footnote continued from preceding page)

Ky. 1932); Ashley v. Commonwealth, 33 S.W.2d 614 (Ky. 1930); Hall v. Commonwealth, 21 S.W.2d 799 (Ky. 1929); Angel v. Commonwealth, 21 S.W.2d 150
(Ky. 1929); Eldridge v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.2d 403 (Ky. 1929); Newsome v.
Commonwealth, 13 S.W.2d 1046 (Ky. 1929); Asher v. Commonwealth, 299 S.W.
568 (Ky. 1927); Tipton v. Commonwealth, 298 S.W. 990 (Ky. 1927); Goodfriend
v. Commonwealth, 288 S.W. 330 (Ky. 1926); Meade v. Commonwealth, 282 S.W.
781 (Ky. 1926); Cloyd v. Commonwealth, 278 S.W. 595 (Ky. 1925); Cody v.
Commonwealth, 276 S.W. 970 (Ky. 1925); Hayes v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.
160 (Ky. 1925); Baughman v. Commonwealth, 267 S.W. 231 (Ky. 1924); Harman
v. Commonwealth, 263 S.W. 733 (Ky. 1924); Clark v. Commonwealth, 256 S.W.
398 (Ky. 1923); Thompson v. Commonwealth, 255 S.W. 852 (Ky. 1923);
Compton v. Commonwealth, 240 S.W. 36 (Ky. 1922); Waters v. Commonwealt,
188 S.W. 490 (Ky. 1916); Mattingly v. Commonwealth, 188 S.W. 370 (Ky.
1916); Commonwealth v. Davis, 185 S.W. 73 (Ky. 1916); Talbott v. Commonwealth, 179 S.W. 621 (Ky. 1915); Commonwealth v. Franks, 175 S.W. 349 (Ky.
1915). This is awesome testimony to the fact that somehow the real importance
and function of the juvenile court were lost upon those judges and lawyers who
should have most diligently labored to maintain its integrity. No one seems to
have ever asked the crucial questions: If we have juvenile courts, then why do we
permit the prosecution of children in adult courts? And if we are going to permit
some children to be prosecuted as criminals, then under what specific conditions
will this be allowed? It seems that these issues would have occurred to someone
in either Watson v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. 1933), in which two
young boys, 11 and 13 years of age, were convicted of manslaughter in circuit
court; or Thomas v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1945), in which an 11
year old boy was convicted in circuit court of raping a 5 year old girl. Neither
their ages nor their offenses were indicative of an inability to be helped by the
juvenile court. The modem attention being given to this question is evidence
that due process is indeed an evolving and fluid concept, because today not only
the procedure but the very substance of transfer proceedings are the subject of
widespread attention and concern. The argument is simply that juvenile courts
exist to help and rehabilitate children, not to abandon them to the adult courts
as was done in the two examples above and which is still being done in too many
cases everyday.
10 See note 4 supra. The issues involved in the transfer of children to adult
criminal courts have been painstakingly analyzed in the following articles: Advisory
Council of Judges, National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Transfer of Cases
Between Juvenile and Criminal Courts: A Policy Statement, 8 Ciam & DEIWmiQUENcY 3 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Council of Judges]; Bazelon,
supra note 4; Croxton, The Kent Case and Its Consequence, 7 J. FA_. L. 1
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Croxton]; Frey, The Criminal Responsibility of the
Juvenile Murderer, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 113 [hereinafter cited as Frey];
Gardner, The Kent Case and the Juvenile Court: A Challenge to Lawyers, 52
A.B.A.J. 923 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Gardner]; Haviland, Daddy Will Take
Care of You: The Dichotomy of the Juvenile Court, 17 KAN. L. REv. 317 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Haviland]; Hays & Solway, The Role of Psychological
Evaluation in Certification of Juveniles for Trial as Adults, 9 HOUSTON L. REv. 709
(1972). McJean An Answer to the Challenge of Kent, 53 A.B.A.J. 456 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as McJean]; Mountford & Berenson, Waiver of Jurisdiction:The
Last Resort of the Juvenile Court, 18 KAN. L. REv. 55 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Mountford & Berenson]; Parker, Transfer of Juvenile Cases to Adult Courts, 48
CAN. B. REv. 336 (1970); Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional
Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 167; Resteiner, Delinquent or
Criminal: The Problems of Transfers of Jurisdiction, 24 Juv. JusrMCE 2 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Resteiner]; Sargent & Gordon, Waiver of Jurisdiction: An
(Continued on next page)
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the substance or significance of the transfer provision as long as
proper procedure was ostensibly followed."'
This state of affairs has been changing rapidly, however,
because, in the years since Kent v. United States,2 the laws per(Footnote continued from preceding page)

Evaluation of the Process in the Juvenile Court, 9 CRmm & DELINQUENCY 121
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Sargent & Gordon]; Schomhorst, The Waiver of
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: Kent Revisited, 48 IND. L.J. 583 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Schornhorst]; Speca & White, Variations and Trends in Proposed Legislaletion on Juvenile Courts, 40 U. Mo. KAN. Crry L. REv. 129 (1972); Note, Juvenile
Justice-Exclusion from the Juvenile Process of Certain Alleged Felons, 53 B.U.L.
REv. 212 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, 53 B.U.L. REV. 212 (1973)]; Note,
Rights and Rehabilitation in Juvenile Courts, 67 COLum. L. REV. 281 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Note, 67 CoLm. L. REv. 281 (1967)]; Note, In Iowa,
Statutory Due Process Requires a Separate Hearing on the Question of Transfer
Before a Juvenile Court May Properly Waive Jurisdictionto the Criminal Court, 22
DRAKE L. REv. 213 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, 22 DRAKE L. REv. 213
(1972)]; Note, Double Jeopardy and the Waiver of Jurisdiction in California
Juvenile Courts, 24 STAN. L. RvV. 874 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, 24 STAN.
L. REV. 874 (1972)]; Note, Juvenile Waiver Statute: Delegation of Legislative
Powers to Judiciary, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 259 [hereinafter cited as Note, 1973 Wis.
L. REv. 259]; Comment, 21 BAYLOR L. REv. 333 (1969); Comments, 9 NATURAL
REsouRcEs J. 310 (1969); Comment, 30 Osno ST. L.J. 132 (1969); Comment, 16 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 604 (1972); Comment, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 424 (1968); Comment,
40 S. CAL. L. REv. 158 (1967); Comment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1171 (1966); Comment, 5 WILrmTTE L.J. 157 (1968); Comment, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 551. Legal
commentators in Kentucky have heretofore only cursorily surveyed the issues involved in the transfer process or in handling juveniles in adult courts. See Note,
The Juvenile Offender: Some Problems and Possible Solutions, 53 KY. L.J. 781
(1965); The 1967-68 Kentucky Court of Appeals Review: Rights of Juveniles, 56
KY. L.J. 285, 360 (1968) [hereinafter cited as The 1967-68 Kentucky Court of
Kentucky Law in Need of Revision, 59
and Note,
Juvenile
Courts:
Appeals
iKy. L.J. Review];
719 (1971)
[hereinafter
cited
as Note,
59 Kr. L.J. 719 (1971)].
the
1965 note is remarkable for its shortsighted, punitive, and formalistic view of The
children who should be sent
to
those
as
especially
justice,
of
juvenile
administration
court.
to criminal
11 See note 8 supra.
held that the transfer proceeding
12838 U.S. 541 (1966). This landmark case
is a critically important proceeding for the child which demands a hearing, the
which
reports the
access he
to the
have should
who
counsel or
effective
to
rightbear
transferred,
not must
the child
question ofofwhether
upon the assistance
cross-examine the authors of those reports, and a statement of reasons from the
judge why the child must be transferred to the criminal court and deprived of his
benefits as a child. The case has definite constitutional dimensions which have
been the subject of some debate. See Schornhorst, supra note 10, at 588. It is not
necessary to enter into this debate, however, because Kent is important for other
reasons. It opened some eyes to the abuses that were present in the juvenile courts
and helped bring some philosophical and procedural consistency to juvenile court
practices at the state level. Of singular importance was the inclusion, in the
Appendix to the opinion, of eight factors which should receive some consideration
during the decision-making process on the question of transfer. The elements
were: (1) the seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether
the protection of the community requires waiver; (2) whether the alleged offense
was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner; (3)
whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight
being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted; (4)
the prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon which
a grand jury may be expected to return an indictment; (5) the desirability of trial
and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the juvenile's associates in
(Continued on next page)
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mitting the prosecution of children in adult courts have come
under intense scrutiny by both courts and commentators. 13 The
national concern about improvement in criminal justice adminis-

tration and an increasing recognition that this reform depends
to some degree on a more enlightened use of the juvenile courts
have moved both courts and legislatures to construct long-overdue
safeguards around the laws permitting children to be transferred
4
to the jurisdiction of criminal courts.1

Kentucky has begun to confront many of the pressing issues
of modern criminal justice administration. Some of these initiatives have drawn national attention and inquiry because they are
new and realistic approaches to serious problems. 5 The proper
utilization of the power to transfer children to the jurisdiction of
criminal courts is important to the overall integrity of this reform.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

e alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime; (6) the
sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of his
home environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living; (7) the
record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts with
juvenile authorities, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other
jurisdictions, prior periods of probation to the court, or prior commitments to
juvenile institutions; and (8) the prospects for adequate protection of the public
and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to
have committed the alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services and
facilities currently available to the juvenile court. While most of these elements
share the same defects as those discussed in section III (D), infra, their inclusion
in Kent, together with the language of the opinion, began a serious revaluation
of the transfer process which has been very instrumental in adding a new depth
to the integrity of juvenile court processes.
13 See note 10 supra and note 24 infra.
14 At least 32 states have, either by statute, case law, or a combination of the
two, erected such provisions to protect the child from an abuse of judicial discretion in the transfer process. The states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See note 6
supra for statutory references and note 24 infra for judicial interpretations.
15 The 1972 General Assembly gave impetus to a number of significant reforms.
Ky. AcTs ch. 77, § 1 [1972] amended KRS § 208.430 and placed restrictions on
the discretion of the Department of Child Welfare in its handling of certain classes
of children who have been in juvenile court. The intent was to de-emphasize the
use of institutions and to work with more children in normal community environments. Ky. AcTs ch. 202, § 1 [1972] amended IRS § 208.110 and provided new
rules for hearings related to the pre-adjudication detention of children subject to
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Ky. AcTs ch. 325, § 1 [19721 amended KRS
§ 208.060 and established landmark guidelines for hearings in juvenile court. Ky.
AcTs. ch. 239, § 1 created KRS § 208.275 and provided for the expungement of
juvenile court records. Ky. AcTs ch. 240, § 1 [1972] amended KRS § 208.380 and
gave children the same right to appeal juvenile court decisions possessed by adults.
Ky. AcTs ch. 353, § 1 [1972] created Chapter 31 of KRS and provided for a statewide public defender system. Ky. AcTs ch. 291, § 1 [1972] amended KRS §
439.320 and reformed the parole board. KY. AcTs ch. 292, § 1 [1972] created KRS
(Continued on next page)
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This law operates at the juncture of juvenile and adult justice,
and it must function in such a way that the processes and sanctions
of criminal justice, as opposed to the rehabilitative programs of
juvenile court, will be brought to bear on as few children as
possible. If a child can be helped within the juvenile justice
system, then help and rehabilitation, rather than transfer to the
criminal court, should be forthcoming.
It would appear that the interests of the state might always
require a prosecution where there has been a relatively serious
crime committed. A criminal prosecution is the only way that
the state can be certain that the offender will be given a long
sentence. The interests of the child, however, may require
rehabilitative treatment at a facility for juveniles rather than
a long sentence in a penal institution. The interests of the
child appear to come into direct conflict with the interests of
the community. The conflict arises, however, not from the result desired, but from the methods to be employed in reaching
that result. Society wants to be assured that the particular
juvenile will not repeat his act. This it hopes to accomplish
by imprisonment for a very long period of time. But the interests of the child also require cessation of his deviant behavior. This end, hopefully, can be reached through the use
of rehabilitative treatment. If the desired result can be
reached by either imprisonment or rehabilitation, the spirit of
the juvenile codes demands rehabilitation over imprisonment.
The juvenile codes were written in order to mitigate the harsh
consequences resulting from the criminal prosecution of children. If the interests of society are allowed to justify such a
criminal prosecution, it would appear that the purposes of
the juvenile codes are being circumvented. 16
§ 489.555 and provided for the conditional release and supervision of felons. Ky.
Acrs ch. 293, §§ 1 et seq. [1972] created KRS §§ 489.580-.680 and provided
for work release and the use of community correctional centers for felons. Ky. AcTs
ch. 290, § 1 [1972 amended KRS § 439.550 to allow probated misdemeanants to
be supervised by the Department of Corrections or some other welfare or fiscal
court agency. Ky. AcTs ch. 294, § 1 [1972] created KRS § 489.177 and provided
for the parole of misdemeanants. Ky. AcTs ch. 295, § 1 [1972] created KRS §
489.179 and provided for the work and educational release of misdemeanants.
Ky. AcTs ch. 885, §§ 1 et seq. [1972] created KRS §§ 433A et seq. and provided a
new penal code for Kentucky. Ky. AcTs ch. 71, §§ 1 et seq. created K1RS §§ 15.410.510 and provided for incentives and pay increases for police personnel. Senate
Bill 170, which would have amended KRS § 208.170 and provided for a realistic
transition between juvenile and criminal courts by reforming the law on transfer
of jurisdiction, did not pass. This ironic oversight made possible the continuation
of abuses inimical to both systems of justice.
16 Mountford & Berenson, supra note 10, at 64-65.

[Vol.
Vl662.

KENTucKY LAw Jou

The respective economies, philosophies and objectives of juvenile
and criminal justice demand that a strict screening for rehabilitative potential take place prior to the submission of any child to
the jeopardies of adult justice, and that children be tried in adult
criminal courts solely as a last resort.
The purpose of this article is to examine the status of transfer
of jurisdiction in the context of Kentucky's present efforts to
reform the overall administration of justice. Developments both
here and in other jurisdictions will be analyzed to determine
what is needed to bring Kentucky abreast of the evolving standards of juvenile justice. Integrity will be a recurrent theme,
because if Kentucky's incipient essays in criminal justice reform
are to stand on a firm foundation, and its dual systems of juvenile
and adult justice are to perform as the General Assembly intends
and the Commonwealth's best interest requires, then a proper
formulation and administration of the law of transfer cannot be
overlooked.
II. Tim

DoCTRINE OF PABENS PATRILAE AND THE RIGHT TO

TREATMENT IN JUVENILE COURT

A. The TraditionalPoint of Departure
The doctrine of parens patriae has endured as a touchstone
for courts and legislatures alike during the nearly 75 years of
juvenile court activity in this country.1 7 Volumes of cases speak
of the court's rehabilitative mission,' 8 and statutory formulations
are replete with provisions for the care, treatment, and rehabilitation of children within the court's purview. 19 Nevertheless, schol17 Discussions on all aspects of this doctrine are found in: Allen, The
Juvenile Court and the Limits of Justice, 11 WAYNE L. REv. 676 (1965); Fox,
Juvenile Justice Reform: An HistoricalPerspective, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1187 (1970);
Ketcham, Legal Renaissancein the Juvenile Courts, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 585 (1965);
Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Juvenile Court, 7 Cansm & DELINQUENCY
97 (1951); Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile
Process?, 57, GEO. L.J. 848, 871-76 (1969); Lipsitt, Due Process as a Gateway to
Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Justice System, 49 B.U.L. REv. 62, 62-68 (1969);
Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HA~v. L. RPv. 104 (1909); McJean, supra note 10;
Nicholas, History, Philosophy, and Proceduresof Juvenile Courts, 1 J. F. i. L. 151
(1961); Parker, Some Historical Observationson the Juvenile Court, 9 Cmi. L.Q.
467 (1967); Paulson, The Juvenile Court and the Whole of the Law, 11 WAYNE
L. REv. 597 (1965); Rendleman, Parens Patriae:From Chancery to Juvenile Court,
23 S.C.L. REv. 205 (1971); Rubin, The Juvenile Court System in Evolution, 2 VAL.
U.L. REV. 1 (1967).
18 Kentucky's contribution to this precedent is found at note 3 supra.
19 The words of KRS §§ 208.110, 208.130, 208.140, 208.200, 208.275,
(Continued on next page)
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ars continue to debate whether this application of the doctrine can
be supported by the precedents of legal history. It would be much
more useful if this academic energy were expended in essays
on how the doctrine might be more effectively utilized to remedy
the problems which caused it to be appropriated by the juvenile
court movement in the first place.
The doctrine has been established beyond question as the
pole star of the juvenile court movement, and there seems to be
little chance that its status will be diminished so long as legislatures retain juvenile courts. The Supreme Court reviewed the
status of parens patriae in the course of imposing certain procedural requirements on the juvenile court process and stated
explicitly that the doctrine is not inconsistent with procedural
due process and is to be recommended to the states as the basis
for further experimentation with the institution of juvenile justice.20 Only recently, however, have the more obvious and farreaching implications of this doctrine been investigated, and these
investigations raise serious issues for the juvenile justice system. 2
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

208.330, 208.400, 208.403, 208.410, 208.420, 208.430, and 208.520 are characteristic of this legislative language and expression of intent.
This statutory context creates a presumption in favor of disposing of
juvenile matters within the juvenile system and makes waiver to criminal
court jurisdiction a last resort to be used only when the juvenile court
after flil hearing determines that the range of dispositions available
within the juvenile system are not adequate in the particular case to
serve the child's welfare and the best interests of the state. Waiver to
criminal court is then to be the exception and as such is to be explicitly
justified in the waiver order.
Atkins v. State, 290 N.E.2d 441, 443 (Ind. 1972). It has been held that when
a state operates dual systems of juvenile and criminal justice with dual procedures
and penalties, there are constitutional protections to which a child can turn in
order to protect his right to be accorded the benefits of the juvenile court. Miller v.
Quatsoe, 382 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Wis. 1971). Due process and equal protection
of the2 0law are two which readily come to mind.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 584, 548 (1971); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 366-67 (1970); and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1967). The
Supreme Court also spoke, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167-68 (1944),
of the importance of the doctrine of parens patriae as a necessary ingredient in
the relationship
between the state and the child.
2
Actually, as early as 1938 courts had addressed the essential issue involved
in sending a child to the criminal court. The Ohio case of In re Lindberg Heist, 11
Ohio Op. 537 (Juv. Ct. 1938), held that no matter how serious the offense a
judge is not justified in transferring a case to the criminal courts unless the child s
own good and the best interests of the state cannot be attained by the juvenile
court s retention of jurisdiction. Since juvenile courts are vested with original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the child and are intended to seek the rehabilitation of
the child, only in exceptional cases should the juvenile court relinquish its jurisdiction over the child. See Comment, 30 Omo ST. L.J. 132, 135 (1969). No one
seems to have understood the import of this message until about 30 years later.
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B. The Modern Claim of a Right to Treatment in Juvenile Court
Some of the principal questions recently raised with respect
to juvenile courts have been: If the court is based on a philosophy
of treatment and rehabilitation, what does this mean for those
children who are being sent to criminal courts? What considerations must go into the decision of the juvenile court to turn its
back on a child? What distinguishing characteristic of a child
will allow such drastic action to be taken in a manner consistent
with the programs and philosophy of the court? How can the
transfer process be made into a rational juvenile court procedure?
What is its proper place, if any, in the scheme of juvenile justice?
These questions constitute part of the subject matter of a
growing literature on the right to treatment both within and
without the field of juvenile law. This issue is of special significance where the transfer of a child to criminal court is concerned.23

The doctrine of parens patriae has provided the

rationale for many cases which have attempted to provide some
logic and coherence to the transfer process and to make it
compatible with the philosophy of the juvenile court. Since
transfer of jurisdiction is a juvenile court decision, it must be
made relative to the ends for which the juvenile court was established: treatment, rehabilitation, and the best interest of the
child. It is only when these objectives cannot be accomplished
within the juvenile justice system that there can be any rational
basis for transferring the child to criminal court. 24 This principle
22 Concern about the legal problems involved in civil commitments for treatment and rehabilitation began in the field of mental health and sread to the area
of juvenile law because of the similarity in purpose between e two kinds of
commitments. A pioneer article that brought the mental health dilemma to
public attention in 1960 was Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.BA.J. 499
1960). He returned to this topic in Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment-Some
Comments on Implementation, 10 DUQUESNE L. lRV. 579 (1972). A comprehensive collection of cases and articles can be found in KrrTTRE, THE RIGHT To BE
DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED THERAPY (1971), and NATIONAL JUVENILE

LAW CENTER, ST. Louis UNivEasrrY SCHOOL OF LAW, SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

(1972).
of the ramifications of the doctrine of parens patriae
which provides a point of departure for the legal literature dealing with the issues
surrounding the transfer of children to criminal court. See note 10 supra.
24 E.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Brown v. Cox, 467 F.2d
1255 (4th Cir. 1972); U.S. v. Tate, 466 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Powell v.
Hocker, 453 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1971); Strickland v. United States, 449 F.2d 1131
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Kemplen v. Maryland, 428 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1970); Haziel v.
U.S., 404 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v. Bland, 330 F. Supp. 34
(D.D.C. 1971); Redmon v. Peyton, 298 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. Va. 1969); Rudolph
FOR BIGHT TO TREATMENT
23 It is an elaboration

(Continued on next page)
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follows from an uncomplicated analysis of the parens patriae
doctrine and its role both as the philosophical foundation of the
juvenile court movement and the cornerstone of the right to
25

treatment.
The magic words in this analysis are right and treatment. The
former, which inheres in the child's statutory right to be dealt
with according to the provisions of the juvenile code, is designed
to guarantee that the humanitarian ends of care and rehabilitation
are served. The essence of this philosophy was expressed at the
beginning of the juvenile court movement:
Why is it not the duty of the state, instead of asking merely
whether a boy or girl has committed a specific offense, to find
out what he is, physically, mentally, morally, and then if it
learns that he is treading the path that leads to criminality,
to take him in charge, not so much to punish as to reform, not
to degrade but to uplift, not to crush but to develop, not to
make him a criminal but a worthy citizen. 26
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

v. State, 238 So.2d 542 (Ala. 1970); Hall v. State, 226 So.2d 630 (Ala. 1969);
Seagroves v. State, 189 So.2d 137 (Ala. 1966); Duck v. State, 176 So.2d 497 (Ala.
1965); P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972); In re Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. J-72804 504 P.2d 501 (Ariz. 1972); L. v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, 498 P.2d 1098, 102 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1972); B. v. Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, 478 P.2d 37, 91 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1970); People v. McFarland, 95 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. 1971); H. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 478
P.2d 32, 91 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1970); People v. Arauz, 85 Cal. Rtr. 266 (Cal.
1970); Richerson v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Cal. 1968); Gagliano v.
State, 234 So.2d 159 (Fla. 1970); J.E.M. v. State, 217 So.2d 135 (Fla. 1968);
Hayes v. Gardner, 504 P.2d 810 (Idaho 1972); State v. Gibbs, 500 P.2d 209
(Idaho 1972); Atkins v. State, 290 N.E.2d 441 (Ind. 1972); Summers v. State 230
N.E.2d 320 (Ind. 1967); State v. Halverson, 192 N.W.2d 765 (Iowa 19715; In
Interest of Brown, 183 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa 1971); In Interest of Patterson, 499
P.2d 1131 (Kan. 1972); Templeton v. State, 447 P.2d 158 (Kan. 1968); Franklin
v. State, 285 A.2d 616 (Md. 1972); Walker v. State, 235 So.2d 714 (Miss. 1970);
Kline v. State, 464 P.2d 460 (Nev. 1970); In re Jackson, 257 N.E.2d 74 (Ohio
1970); State v. Yoss, 225 N.E.2d 275 (Ohio 1967); State ex rel. Juvenile Department of Marion County v. Johnson, 501 P.2d 1011 (Ore. 1972); State v.
Weidner, 487 P.2d 1385 (Ore. 1971); Knott v. Langlois, 231 A.2d 767 (R.I.
1967); Peyton v. French, 147 S.E.2d 739 (Va. 1966); State v. McArdle, 194
S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 1973).
25 It would be inappropriate to indulge in a detailed analysis of the right to
treatment issue in this article because it would entail an extensive digression
inimical to the continuity demanded by an essay of this rather concentrated purview. It is important, however, that this emerging right be fully understood so
that the critical nature of the transfer proceeding will be obvious to those who
confront it. Therefore, a short summary of the right to treatment issue will be
rendered prior to the detailed consideration of the transfer process and the
problems
which beset that law.
26
Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HAIIv. L. REv. 104, 107 (1909). It is very
difficult not to quote this early proponent of the juvenile court when looking for
(Continued on next page)
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Children had no such claim to special treatment at the common
law. This right, created by legislative decree, was not tendered
lightly because it entailed a considerable divestment of jurisdiction from the normal processes of the criminal law. 28 It has
endured for almost 75 years, becoming increasingly meaningful
for the children who enjoy its protections.
The treatment to which the child has a right inheres in the
doctrine of parens patriae.29 The juvenile court has never been
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

pointed language on the aims and essence of juvenile justice. It is interesting,
owever, to read him in conjunction with Ketcham, The Changing Philosophy of
the Juvenile Justice System, 20 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 59 (1969). Judge Mack's
optimism is reflected upon by an author looking at the realities of juvenile justice
70 years after its inception in the United States based on the implementation of
the "mutual compact' between the state and the child. Note 2 supra. Relative
to this interaction between the state and the child, one author has rather
optimistically stated that: "The democratic concepts of individual integrity and
rehabilitation of the child embody the philosophy of the juvenile justice system."
Lipsitt, Due Process as a Gateway to Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Justice System,
49 B.U.L. REv. 62, 78 (1969). Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67
(1944) also speaks of the role of parens patriae in a democratic society. This is
a sound philosophical point of departure taken from the announced principles and
values of-this country. It has, however, received much more lip service than actual
support during the last three-quarters of a century. This is evidenced by the
long tradition of haphazard diagnostic and dispositional work followed by illadvised or badly structured probations, inappropriate institutions, foster homes
and poor follow-up supervision which have caused many children to be called
"untreatable." Sargent & Gordon, supra note 10, at 124. The situation described in
In Interest of Patterson, 499 P.2d 1131 (Kan. 1972), is all too typical. Add to
this the fact that many juvenile courts are operated by procedures entirely prejudicial to the child, and it becomes fairly obvious that no one is really sure that
judge Mack's vision cannot be realized. The means to reach it have simply not
been traditionally employed, either in the courts or in the treatment agencies. The
modem juvenile court revolution seems to be changing a lot of these abuses, however, and perhaps juvenile justice will yet attain the goals for which it was
established.
27 This was recently brought home in a most drastic way when the Oklahoma
transfer law ran into trouble with the courts and it was held that in the absence
of the law the sole test for determining whether or not a child should stay under
juvenile court jurisdiction would be whether or not he knows right from wrong.
Freshour v. Turner, 496 P.2d 389 (Okla. 1972). See also Schaffer v. Green, 496
P.2d 375 (Okla. 1972), for a good discussion of the "7-14" rule with respect to
transfer proceedings and the question of responsibility for the commission of
public offenses. Broadway v. Beto, 338 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Tex. 1971), State v.
Broadman, 267 A.2d 592 (Del. 1970), and In re Correia, 243 A.2d 759 (R.I.
1968) also held that children have no special rights under the common law and
that a legislature can give and take juvenile court privileges as it sees fit. Lamb v.
Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972), however, held that the establishment of
different ages for boys and girls with respect to a transfer statute (16 for boys
and 18
2 8 for girls) does not provide equal protection of the law.
Krrrnn,

Tman
RIGHT TO BE DIFERnENT: DEviANcE AND ENFORCED TRE ArY

(1971), provides a detailed study of the development and problems of this divestment.
29 Stated in its simplest terms, the right to treatment means that those children
who are able to be helped by the court have a right, by virtue of the juvenile
(Continued on next page)
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equated with a criminal court. It is a civil forum, and its dispositions are civil, indeterminate, and aimed at the treatment and
rehabilitation of the child. 30 The only legitimate basis for distinguishing among children, for the purpose of determining who
will be extended the protections of the juvenile court and who
will be denied its regenerative good will, is whether they are
amenable to rehabilitation under the aegis of the court's philosophy and resources. 81
This places a heavy burden on the juvenile court and the state
to make available the kinds of rehabilitative options necessary to
give this principle the substance implied by the legislative appropriation and judicial interpretation of the doctrine of parens
patriae. Any other interpretation does violence to the institution
of juvenile justice and makes it an arbitrary forum where those
who are most in need of its care and solicitude can be abandoned
at the whim of the court. This is very often the case where transfer of jurisdiction is involved and that is why the right to treatment
and the benefits of juvenile court jurisdiction are so important to
the child facing a possible trip to the criminal court. If such children do not have a right to claim treatment from the court, then
juvenile courts serve little purpose in this age of justice reform.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

statute and the doctrine of parens patriae, to the care and rehabilitation afforded
by the court. Strict safeguards should protect that right, but there are none in
force under Kentucky's present transfer law. It is only when a child cannot be
helped by the court that it becomes reasonable to reluctantly look outside the
juvenile justice system for some other means to deal with the child, and neither
age, offense, prior record, nor any other factor can serve, without further investigation into the child's capacity to be helped by the court, as a rational basis of
distinction if the court is to keep intact its integrity as an institution established
to look after the best interests of children and to provide for their care, treatment,
and rehabilitation. See note 17 supra, especially McJean, Simms, and Kittrie. The
word "treatment" comes to juvenile court from parens patriae practices and traditions which existed before juvenile courts were established. Criminological and
scientific preoccupations and theories have cast "treatment" in terms of a medical
model based on disease and cure. Krrrnm, THE RIGHT To BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED THRAPY (1971). The word and much of the underlying
connotation persist today. The treatment goal of the court is based on the doctrine
of parens patriaewhich becomes, thereby the cornerstone of the right to treatment.
Simms, The Courts, The Constitution and Juvenile Institutional Reform, 52 B.U.L.
REV. 33 45-49 (1972). Kittrie calls the right to treatment the "price tag' without
which the powers of parens patriae may not be exercised. Kittrie, Can the Right to
Treatment
Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process?, 57 GEo. L.J. 848, 882 (1969).
30
See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 546-48 (1971); In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966); and
Dryden v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.2d 457, 461 (Ky. 1968).
31 Note, 67 CoLmm. L. REv. 281 (1970), supra note 10, at 317, and Croxton,
supra note 10, at 8.
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III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE TRANsFFR PROCESS:
PROCEDURAL FoRiu

IN SEARCH OF SUBSTANCE

A. Definition of the Procedure
There are three basic ways by which a child can end up in
criminal court: (1) a juvenile judge can transfer him as a matter
of discretion; (2) selected serious crimes may simply be removed
from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court; and (3) a prosecutor
may have the discretion to file charges against him in criminal
court rather than juvenile court.3 2 These may be viewed as
judicial, legislative and prosecutorial forms of transferring juris3
diction.
Judicial transfer describes a context in which the juvenile
courts have a discretionary power, beginning toward the upper
age level of their jurisdictional grant, to transfer children to
criminal court for disposition as adults. Sometimes this is possible
only when felonies are concerned, but it often includes any
crime.3 4 Traditionally exercised in the absence of any clear guidelines relating to who could or should be transferred, it was recently
held in People v. Fields5 to entail an unlawful legislative delegation of power and discretion to the judiciary. The argument
was that the judiciary has been enabled to decide who shall be
tried for crimes, traditionally a legislative function, in the absence
of any criteria governing this determination. The Fields court
observed, in part, that the traditional delegation of this power
can no longer be upheld because transfer decisions are not being
made on the basis of uniform and easily discernible standards.
The reasons for transfer vary greatly from one judge to another
and therefore the law is not evenly administered. Should the
Fields rationale be adopted in other jurisdictions, it could force
legislatures to infuse even more regularity into juvenile court
proceedings by establishing clear standards and guidelines for
the transfer of jurisdiction. 6
3

2 Note, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 281 (1967), supra note 10, at 310.
33 Scbornborst, supranote 10, at 596.

34 Id. at 597.
35 199 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 1972); contra Lewis v. State, 478 P.2d 168 (Nev.
1970). The Fields case is discussed in Note, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 259, supra note 10,

and Resteiner, supra note 10. Definite criteria are needed to prevent a judicial
deviation from the legislative purpose behind juvenile court laws. State v. Gibbs,
500 P.2d
209, 216 (Idaho 1972).
36
Note, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 259, supra note 10, at 263. The Resteiner article
supra note 10, was written by a Michigan judge who points out a number ot
interesting local problems involved in the Fields case.
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Legislative transfer is really a misnomer because rather than
transferring certain children to criminal court jurisdiction, the
legislature has merely excluded them from the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court. The chief, in fact the only, criticism of this approach is that if all offenses are not initially subject to management within the juvenile justice system, there is an inherent in37
compatibility with the avowed philosophy of the juvenile court.
It is tantamount to saying that children who commit certain
offenses cannot be rehabilitated and must be sent to criminal
court to protect the public safety and common good. There is
no evidence that this procedure is in the best interest of either
the child or society; rather, there is a mountain of demonstrable
data indicating that it is deleterious to both.
Prosecutorial transfer provisions allow the prosecutor to exercise discretion over the choice of which children shall be tried as
adults. The critical determinant is where the charges are filed.
This form of transfer has been criticized for being inherently
subject to political manipulation and unrealistically assuming
that a single individual can dispassionately weigh the interests
of the child and the state at the same time. It is an arbitrary
method, and the discriminatory choices allowed by this form of
transfer run counter to due process and equal protection of the

laws. It is subject to many of the same criticisms directed at
judicial transfer.38
There is one other form of transfer which has been called
"Texas style"39 because of the foothold it obtained in Texas
juvenile court practice. This procedure allowed the prosecutor to
sit on charges until the child became an adult, and then prosecute
him in criminal court; or charge him with one of several offenses
in juvenile court while he is a minor, have him put in a training
school, and then indict him for the other offenses when he reaches
majority. This abuse was initially made possible in Texas because
the courts held that the age at the time of trial rather than at the
time of the offense was controlling. This practice was finally
37
Schornhorst, supra note 10, at 596-97. judicial reactions to these exclusions
are found in Note, 53 B.U.L. REv. 212 (1973), supra note 10. A review of the
transfer statutes, note 6 supra, will show a great divergence of views indicative of
more or less adherence to the tenets of juvenile court philosophy.
38 Schornhorst, supra note 10 at 598.
So Id. at 599.
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amended in Texas. However, other states still extend such an
invitation to those who would so abuse the forum of juvenile
justice.

40

The primary criticism of determining juvenile court jurisdiction by age at the time of the proceedings is that it allows the
purposes of juvenile legislation to be frustrated by delays, which
often result in the prosecution of the child as an adult. It has
been observed that when the age at trial rather than the age at
the time of the offense is controlling, the common law of incapacity may no longer apply, thus effectively terminating the
use of incapacity as a defense. 4 ' It has been suggested that both
the jurisdictional problem with respect to age and the societal
need to salvage these young citizens would be well served by
providing specialized treatment for young offenders beyond
juvenile court age and within the range of those who are liable
to transfer.42 This might provide both for the child's or young
adult's interest in being helped to constructive citizenship and
society's need to see that its laws are not frustrated by the chronology of offense and trial.
The judicial form of transfer is most prevalent, and the procedure is variously referred to as a transfer of jurisdiction, a
certification or transfer to the grand jury or criminal court, a
waiver of rights, or a waiver to the grand jury. The juvenile court
generally speaks in terms of sending the child to criminal, circuit,
or adult court, or simply "holding him over." This descriptive
language touches the basic aspect of the procedure in that it
informs everyone that a movement is taking place. In this case,
401d. at 602. This problem is also discussed in Comment, 5 Win.imLrrE
L.J. 157 (1968) and Courtade, supra note 10. Kentucky could well be faced with
a similar problem because of cases like Koonce v. Commonwealth, 452 S.W.2d 822
(Ky. 1970), and Lowry v. Commonwealth, 424 S.W.2d 841 (Ky. 1968). The
Lowrt court noted that its ruling was in accord with a majority of jurisdictions,
and this seems to indicate that a majority of courts lose touch with the dictating
principles
of juvenile justice when confronted with this question.
41
See Comment, 5 WrLLAMEr L.J. 157 158 (1968). Such a law has
serious implications for the processes of juvenile justice because such a great
percentage of felony arrests are made on children between the ages of 16-23.
Schornhorst, supra note 10, at 592, 595. This group also constitutes a great
number of those who return to crime' after prior contact with the court. Note also
that it has been held that juvenile court procedures cannot be delayed in order
to prosecute a child when he attains the age of majority. Miller v. Quatsoe, 348
F. Supp. 764 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
42 Schornhorst, supra note 10, at 595, and Comment, 5 W=n
r
L.J. 157

(1968).
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a child is being moved from juvenile court into the criminal
justice system. This process is literally a "transfer" of jurisdiction
over a case from the juvenile forum to the criminal court.
The court is not "waiving" some right or power; rather it is
considering retention of jurisdiction. Only on the findings of a
hearing does it transfer the case, which it does by certifying
that certain criteria have been met and that consequently the
43
criminal court is empowered to take jurisdiction.
When this is done properly, it should be based on a judicial
determination of fact that the child is beyond the capabilities
of the rehabilitative resources of the juvenile court. 44 This is the
only basis upon which a transfer can ever be justified, and the
decision should therefore be accompanied by caution, circumspection, and detailed investigation.
The two basic judicial approaches to the transfer of jurisdiction
have been described as jurisdictional and dispositional. A jurisdictional judge will use the elements of age and the nature of the
offense as the basis of his decision, while the dispositional judge
will weigh all factors against the possibility of helping the child
through some means at the disposal of the juvenile court. While
the dispositional approach is certainly more consistent with the
philosophy of juvenile court, there is room for abuse in both
methods. The dispositional judge might not transfer the child
if he feels that the child may be released because of a failure to
prosecute, the posting of bail, an acquittal or probation. He
wants to help the child too much. This often puts very difficult
or perhaps even innocent children into juvenile programs. However, these programs should be geared to match the child, not vice
versa. The jurisdictional judge is not so treatment oriented,
however, and is pleased to have another court take over his
45
problems.
43
44

Advisory Council of Judges, supranote 10, at 4.
Schornhorst, supra note 10, at 586, and Comment, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 424,
440 (1968). It is this fact-finding process which must be greatly improved by
providing safeguards and establishing standards so that there can be some basis and
record upon which to review the discretion of the juvenile judge in his decision
to transfer
a child to criminal court.
45
Note, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 281 (1967), supra note 10, at 316. The dynamics
of the juvenile court decision-making process are superbly explored in R. EMERSON,
JUDGING DELINQUENTS: CoNTET AND PRocESs IN JUVENILE COURT (1969) and W.
STAPLETON & L. TErrELBAUtm, IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH: A STUDY OF T=E ROLE OF
COUNSEL IN A

nicAN JUvENILE CoUnTS (1972).
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The legislative choice of the timing of the transfer hearing
has some bearing on whether juvenile judges are likely to
espouse a jurisdictional or dispositional view. Transfer hearings may be held either upon receipt of the initial petition or
after the court has held an adjudicative hearing and determined that the youth committed the offense alleged. In the
former case, the transfer decision will not be colored by evidence of the instant crime and is therefore less likely to be
dispositionally motivated than would be the case if the judge
had already satisfied himself of the youth's guilt. However,
this early hearing deprives the judge of information which
may be helpful to the transfer decision; indeed, the nature of
the youth's participation in the crime may, if the youth is a
first offender, be the only available evidence of criminal maturity. The delayed hearing makes this information available,
but also introduces into the determination the judge's subjective belief in the guilt of the juvenile. It is true that requiring evidence of guilt prior to transfer may protect a youth
from the rigors of an unnecessary criminal trial. But the fact
of guilt may itself improperly influence the judge's transfer
decision by diverting his attention from more revealing evidence of the youth's susceptibility to rehabilitation. Because
the post-adjudication transfer hearing introduces this further
consideration, it is apt to foster a dispositional approach. 46
These considerations should be kept in mind by lawmakers who
seek to reform the laws on transfer of jurisdiction and make them
more consistent with the philosophy of the juvenile court.
No matter how this process is denominated or described, it is
best defined by characterizing it as the most critical stage of the
juvenile justice process. Courts and legal commentators alike
agree on this significant point.47 The determination that the
transfer stage is "critical' finally gained Morris Kent the right to
counsel, and the factors to be considered in transferring a child,
set forth in the Appendix to the Supreme Court's opinion, drew
46 Note, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 281 (1967), supra note 10, at 318. This procedure was evidently followed in Rudolph v. State, 238 So.2d 542 (Ala. 1970);
Seagroves v. State, 189 So.2d 137 (Ala. 1966); and In re Jackson, 257 N.E.2d 74
(Ohio 1970).
47Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966); Smith v. Commonwealth,
412 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Ky. 1967). This is a point of departure for the articles at
note 10 supra, and is particularly well set forth in Schornhorst, supra note 10, at
586-94. Representative cases are found at note 24 supra.
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of the transfer proceeding. 48
national attention to the substance
49

This attention was long overdue.
There is every reason in the world to call this the most critical
stage of the system. The transfer law constitutes a line on the
other side of which lies the threshold to the criminal justice
system. On the juvenile court side of that line, there is an arrange-

ment of individualized justice therapeutically oriented to the best
interest of the child."' On the other side lies a system of criminal
process and sanction predicated, for the most part, on punishment
and the best interest of society. The difference between one side
and the other may well mean the difference between five years
under juvenile jurisdiction and life imprisonment.5' The sides are
two wholly different worlds, and the liabilities of the adult system

are so great that every effort should be made to keep children
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
Those cases in which transfer is contemplated usually foresee
some type of confinement if the child's guilt or delinquency is
established. It becomes a choice, therefore, between a juvenile

institution and some type of adult correctional facility, and while
there may often be little difference in the administration of either
institution, the decision to transfer a child to criminal court carries
significant consequences beyond the type of institution in which

the youth is to be confined.

2

There is convincing evidence that most juvenile court personnel, and the judges themselves, regard the waiver of jurisdic48
Kent was one of the "critical stage" decisions of the 1960's which saw the
enormous expansion and elaboration of the right to counsel. The standards set
forth in the Appendix to that decision were taken from a Policy Memorandum
(No. 7, 1959) of the District of Columbia Juvenile Court. The rescission of this
memorandum was noted in U.S. v. Caviness, 239 F. Supp. 545, 551 (D.D.C.
1965), which was decided before the Kent case. The "critical stage" philosophy
remained after this rescission, however, both because of Kent v. United States
and other District of Columbia cases, such as U.S. v. Tate, 446 F.2d 432 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), and Haziel v. United States, 404 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1968). District
of Columbia Juvenile Court Rules 108 and 109 now contain a much less definite
transfer standard.
49 There was almost no attention given to the question of standards or a
child's right to be kept under juvenile court jurisdiction prior to the Kent case.
Two exceptions are Duck v. State, 176 So.2d 497 (Ala. 1965), and In re Lindberg
Heist, 11 Ohio Op. 537 (Juv. Ct. 1938). Note the great majority of post-Kent
dates on the articles collected at note 10 supra, and the cases collected at note 24
supra. The Kent case began a revolution of its own which is really separate from
that initiated by In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), which brought due process to
delinquency hearings.
GO See notes 3 and 24 supra.
Croxton, supra note 10, at 3.
51
52
Schornhorst, supra note 10, at 594.
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tion as the most severe sanction that may be imposed by the
juvenile court. Not only is the juvenile exposed to the probability of severe punishment, but the confidentiality and individuality of the juvenile proceeding is replaced by the publicity and normative concepts of penal law; the child acquires
a public arrest record which, even if he is acquitted, will inhibit his rehabilitation because of the opprobium attached
thereto by prospective employers; if convicted as an adult,
the child may be detained well past his twenty-first birthday;
he may lose certain civil rights and be disqualified for public
employment. Moreover, if sent to a typical adult prison, he is
likely to be subjected to physical, and even sexual, abuse by
older inmates, and his chances for rehabilitation are likely to
decrease significantly. 53
The problems inherent in incarcerating children with adult
criminals are compounded by the fact that most states have no
special programs for young offenders. 4 The decision to transfer
must therefore be made with the realization that the child will
probably be sent to an adult prison where no special rehabilitative
and guidance programs will be available. Even if he is not treated
harshly by the trial court-in which case he should never have
been sent to the criminal court in the first place-he will be unable
to erase the record of his conviction. 55 This may well be determinative of whether he becomes a content, constructive, lawabiding citizen who is an asset to the community, or a restless,
destructive, alienated renegade whose criminal activity tears at
the fabric of society and makes him a burden on the state, either
within or without the walls of its penal institutions. 56
The stakes are very high in a transfer proceeding. Will the
child be extended the regenerative resources of the juvenile court
by its retention of jurisdiction or be started on the first step
531d. at 586-87. These are all possibilities and realities under Kentucky law
and in Kentucky institutions.
54 Kentucky has some such facilities, but they in turn have long waiting lists.
55Schornhorst, supra note 10, at 594.
55
There is an economic aspect of crime which has not been sufficiently impressed upon the public. Suffice it to say that the combined cost of criminal
activity and criminal justice responses is staggering compared to the sums it would
take to begin to alleviate the causes of crime both in society and in its "correctional"
institutions. Taxpayers, paradoxically, have traditionally chosen to support the
most costly of these alternatives, however and almost with relish. Of late, however,
the relish has bittered and more palatable forms of addressing the problems of
crime and corrections have emerged.
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of a Igal and social journey to the human trash pile 57 to which
ex-convicts and other criminal defendants are so often relegated?
These consequences can make the decision to transfer ". . . in
essence, a sentence of 'death' as a juvenile, with the subsequent
proceedings in the criminal court completing the execution."58
These are the attributes which make a transfer of jurisdiction the
most critical stage of juvenile justice procedures.
B. The ParadoxicalNature of Transfer Provisions
Depending on the point of view one takes, the existence of a
transfer provision will seem a more or less paradoxical inclusion
in the scheme of juvenile justice. Any transfer of jurisdiction
strikes at the most basic philosophical elements of the juvenile
court system, for it is an admission that the system cannot or
does not want to try to rehabilitate one member of the class of
individuals for whom it was created. The very existence of
juvenile court is predicated upon recognition of the fact that
a child is capable of rehabilitation no matter what he may have
done and that he has a right to expect no less than that society,
through the special establishment of juvenile court, will seek to
identify and treat the root causes of the trouble in which he is
involved rather than seek retribution against him.
The historical inadequacy of juvenile correctional and rehabilitation programs in the United States forces one, however
reluctantly, to submit to the existence of transfer laws and the
role they play when a child must make the transition from juvenile to adult court. As long as good rehabilitative programs
remain conspicuously absent for those children subject to transfer,
there will have to be some way to maintain an effective jurisdiction
over the child to preserve the interests of justice, if not of juvenile
court philosophy or the child. The inadequacy, however, will not
be remedied by reliance on the transfer process. The need is for
programs that will make it unnecessary to abandon these children
at all.5 9
Considering what is at stake, it would seem that one might
expect to find these grave and far-reaching procedures carefully
Schornborst, supra note 10, at 594.
58 Id.at 588.
59 Sargent & Gordon, supra note 10, at 128.
57
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defined and subject to rigorous procedural and investigative safeguards to protect the child's interests. This is not always the case.
One might also expect to find a clear statement of the purpose
for permitting a child to be sent to the criminal courts, but few
jurisdictions have undertaken to explicitly delineate the policies
underlying the procedure. Justifications are tendered in lieu of
reasoned policy analysis.60
The absence of standards and clearly articulated policies compels one to ask for what reason society has seen fit to include transfer provisions in the scheme of juvenile justice. The only thing that
criminal courts can do that juvenile courts cannot do is to put a
child in the penitentiary to accomplish "rehabilitation" which the
juvenile court felt it could not provide. Adult criminal processes,
however, conform the sentence to the crime. Sentences therefore
are determinate, and it is frequently said that determinate sentences are anti-rehabilitative. This is certainly the case where
children are concerned, because it is the youngest who are always
victimized in prison; the weakest who are hurt by the strongest;
and the most innocent who are defiled by the most depraved.
If they are not exploited, they will certainly become more aggressive out of a need for self-protection. 61 It would seem, then, that
since prison is not relied upon to rehabilitate anyone, but simply
"to teach him a lesson," the transfer process is ultimately reduced
to simple retribution. And since the best lesson traditionally taught

in prisons is how to be a better offender, the use of prisons for anything short of the permanent removal of an individual from the
ranks of society is seemingly a most ill-advised action. Stacks
of reports and evaluations of our present penal system attest to
this reality, as do the rates of recidivism among those who have
tenanted the "reformatories" of this country. If anything should
be obvious, it should be the hopelessness of this traditional
recourse as a means of protecting and promoting the general
welfare of society and its citizenry.
The only way criminal courts can act to fulfill the societal
60 Comment, 114 U. PA. L. BEv. 1171, 1206 (1966). It is very easy to find
the legislative and judicial rationales for creating and upholding juvenile court
legislation, but it is impossible to trace down anything to explain why transfer
provisions were included in these laws. Even the venerable and oft-cited Judge
Julian Mack seems to have taken them for granted. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23
HAv. L. REv. 104, 108-09 (1909).
61 Sargent & Gordon, supra note 10, at 125.
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demands underlying a transfer of jurisdiction is to treat the child
as an expendable human statistic and give him a life sentence.
Such sentences, however, are only handed down in the most
extraordinary cases, 6 2 and one is finally compelled to ask what
logic there is in the use of probation or a minimum security
facility for a child who was transferred out of court because he
was too "dangerous" and a "security risk"? Such a child should
have been kept in juvenile court.63
This means that community expectations will seldom be fulfilled by transfer to the criminal court. Why, then, do judges
continue to do it? It has been suggested that communities are
still not convinced of the value of juvenile court and continue to
demand retribution for public offenders. If this punitive appetite
is not fed from time to time, the resultant frustration might mean
the undoing of the juvenile justice system. The transfer process
becomes the safety valve through which this community pressure
is released. 64 This is clearly a gesture of retribution, however, and
inconsistent with the philosophy of the juvenile court. One author
has stated bluntly that it is neither philosophical consistency nor
studied policy considerations which support the practice of transferring jurisdiction, but rather:
a compromise of principle dictated by the unwillingness
of society to pay the price necessary to find out whether our
theories of justice for the juvenile are at all valid. Waiver,
therefore, remains an unsatisfactory, but nevertheless practical, means of ridding the juvenile court of persons whom it is
not equipped to handle, and, more likely than not, has mishandled in the first place. Secondly, as indicated by the reported cases, waiver usually is not a scientific evaluation of
whether the youth will respond successfully to a juvenile
...

62 Id. at 126. If society is truly concerned about reforming and deterring the
public offender, and the broad consensus about the miserable condition of our
penal system is accurate, then the sort of analysis engaged in here is important
because it says that almost no child should ever be subjected to the criminal
system unless he is given at least a life sentence without a chance for parole. The
Kentucky Court of Appeals has held, however, that to so sentence a child is cruel
and unusual punishment. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 70 (Ky.
1971);
63 Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968).
Sargent & Gordon, supra note 10, at 125. If juvenile courts can't do anything for the child, it is futile to look to the criminal courts to do so. See the
text accompanying note 53 supra for examples of the harm done to one who is
punished rather than "helped."
64 ld. at 126.

KEN

c

LAw JouRNALVo

[Vol. 62.

court disposition, but a front for society's insistence on retribution or social protection. 65

The two important elements of this observation concentrate
on the concern for social protection engendered by the juvenile
court's inability or reluctance to handle all the children who
come within its jurisdiction. There is substance to this comment
because the juvenile justice system does not have an entirely
enviable record of providing for the young people it has dealt
with over the years. It has too often forced treatment on those
who did not need it, i.e., status and lesser public offenders, while
denying it to those about whom it should have been most concerned, i.e., the serious but salvagable young public offenders
routinely transferred to criminal court.66 It has been forcefully
argued that the juvenile justice system discriminates against its
most needy clientele because of its treatment of the black, the
poor, and the deprived.6 7 These are the children who are most
liable to be transferred because of previous appearances in court.
They are also the ones who are most in need of social integration
and rehabilitation and most likely to have anti-social tendencies
reinforced by contact with adult offenders.68 These are not the
children of judges, lawyers, lawmakers, professionals, or others of
"acceptable" social status and economic standing. When the
well-to-do child gets into trouble, his parents are allowed to
handle it out of court and to get private help. The courts
are generally willing to accept this even when serious cases are
involved. Therefore, the children from "acceptable" families do
not suffer from the lack of juvenile court facilities. The dispossessed are forced to bear this burden by the double-standard of
justice in the juvenile court, and the paradox is thereby transmuted into an unequal protection of the law.6
The paradox which permits a child to gain adult status through
criminal process becomes even more obvious when it is noted
that no matter how exemplary a child is as a student, citizen,
65 Schornhorst, supra note 10, at 602. The discussion of the collection of
reasons why judges send children to criminal courts, infra, will offer considerable
support for this point of view.
66 Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process,
57 GEo. L.J. 848,860-61 (1969).
67 Bazelon, supra note 10, at 876.
68
69 Comment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1171, 1209 (1966).
Bazelon, supranote 10, at 377.
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patriot, breadwinner or whatever, he cannot obain the privileges
and responsibilities of adulthood. He cannot vote; he cannot
marry, enter the armed services, or obtain a driver's license without parental permission; he cannot contract; he cannot buy certain
films, books or drinks; he cannot enjoy many other rights and
duties of adult status. Through the doctrine of "emancipation" a
child can become liable for his or her own financial support.
This is a tenuous status, however, and carries with it none of the
other indicia of legal majority. The model child simply cannot
enhance his legal status in any way.
However, let him break the law by an otherwise felonious
act and the juvenile justice system has made it a relatively
simple matter to strip him of his fragile minority and submit him
to the processes of the criminal law. Would it not be more in
the interest of society to recognize the positive accomplishments
of its children and offer adult rights and responsibilities to those
who would shoulder them and treat as children those who had
demonstrated an inability to comport with the norms of adult
society? 70 Instead of this seemingly logical approach to defining
adult status, there are laws which severely restrict the lawful
activities of children and, at the same time, treat them as adult
criminals in other circumstances. This situation works hardships
on children and results in a number of problems both for them
and for the rest of society. Perhaps the greatest paradox of all
is that many parents have helped enact and interpret the laws
and determine what resources shall be made available to the very
court which, acting as parent substitute, sends so many children
to the criminal courts.
These several observations are offered for the assistance they
might provide in grasping the totality of the problem involved
in the transfer law and process. A strict adherence to the principles of juvenile law and philosophy would obviously warrant its
elimination, and, indeed, this has been suggested. 7' For the
70 They would not have to be excluded from the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court at the same time. The malleability of their youth would still be an asset in
their rehabilitation should they violate the law.
71 Sargent & Gordon, supra note 10, at 128, say that once the underlying
motivations to p~unish are understood, there will be little need to transfer because
the decision-making process will be purified of one of its most debasing elements.
See also Schornhorst, supra note 10 at 595, who says that special provisions
should be made for the 16-25 year old offender in accord with the rehabilitative

(Continued on next page)
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present, transfer provisions must be endured as a continuing part
of juvenile justice for at least the foreseeable future. Since that
is so, the administration of such laws must be examined and made
to conform as much as possible to the traditional juvenile court
tenets of care, treatment, rehabilitation, and the best interest
of the child. This can be done by viewing transfer to criminal
court as a last resort and restricting transfer laws so that they
affect only children who are completely beyond the rehabilitative
potential of the juvenile court.
C. TraditionalRationalizationsand Justificationsfor the Transfer
of Childrento CriminalCourts
In 1962, the Advisory Council of Judges of the National
Council on Crime and Delinquency published the results of a
survey which indicated several reasons why children were being
sent to criminal courts: (1) the presence of an issue of contestable
fact which would prolong a juvenile proceeding; (2) a serious
offense occurring after previous correctional treatment; (3) a
feeling that the child's case was hopeless; (4) a desire to punish
the child for his attitude; and (5) the superior resources for
treatment and benefit to public safety which the criminal court
possessed over the juvenile court.7 2 Subsequently, in 1965, Sargent
and Gordon reported finding, in addition to those factors collected
by the Advisory Council, that juvenile judges sent children to
criminal court because they felt there were some children who
just were not children. 73 A later and more comprehensive survey,
conducted in 1966 by the Children's Bureau of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice,
revealed more specific criteria: (1) seriousness of alleged offense,
(2) record and history of the juvenile, including prior contacts
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

philosophy of the juvenile court and society's best interest. Removing them from
crimina1 process would severely curtail the need for a transfer provision. It might
be added- that simply educating the courts and the public to the problems involved
in the incarceration of young offenders might serve to reduce the numbers of those
transferred
to criminal courts. Id. at 586-87.
72
Advisory Council of judges, supra note 10, at 5, and Schornhorst, .supra note
10. at 603. Note that the stud.es cited in notes 77-79 infra were completed either
before or so soon after the Kent case as not to be influenced by the reappraisal of
the law which that case engendered.
73 Sargent & Gordon, supra note 10, at 122-23.
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with police, courts or other official agencies, (3) aggressive,
violent, premeditated or wilfull manner in which the offense was
committed, (4) the sophistication, maturity and emotional attitude of the child, (5) the proximity of the child's age to the
maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction, (6) more appropriate
procedures, services and facilities for the likelihood of reasonable
rehabilitation, available in the adult court, (7) the possible need for
a longer period of incarceration, (8) evidence apparently sufficient
for a grand jury indictment, (9) the fact that the child's associates
in the alleged offense will be charged with crime in an adult court,
(10) the effect of the judgment of waiver on the public's respect
for law enforcement and law compliance, and (11) the community's attitude toward the specific offense. A majority of the
courts polled by the Children's Bureau agreed that at least four
factors should control the decision to transfer. These were: (1)
age, (2) seriousness of the offense, (3) seriousness of prior offenses, and (4) a discouraging treatment prognosis. A significant
number also felt that the potential effect of the offender on others
in a juvenile institution should be a consideration. 4 A survey
conducted in Wisconsin turned up 22 different reasons being
employed as bases for transferring children to criminal courts,
as well as the fact that there was no uniformity among judges
on why they transferred a child to adult court. This study found
one judge making the decision to transfer, in part, on the basis
of whether the child would be harmed by the acquisition of a
criminal record, 75 while a study on the effect of the Gault decision
in Kentucky revealed that a certain hostility to the presence of
counsel was likely to result in the child being sent to criminal
court.70 The reasons used in the juvenile courts in this country
are endlessly varied and probably as equally unrelated to rehabilitative potential as many of the factors already catalogued.
The Advisory Council of Judges observed that all but one of
74 CHILDREN'S BURtEAU, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE 78,
Appendix B, Table 5 (1966). Collections of these factors and those at notes 72-73,
supra, are also found in the contexts of other discussions of the transfer question in
Schronhorst, supra note 10, at 603; Comment. 30 OHIO ST. LJ. 132 (1969); Com-

ment, 16 ST. Louis U.L.J. 604, 609-13 (1972); Comment, 114 U. PA. L. REv.
1171, 1208 (1966); Comment, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 551.
75 Comment, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 551.
76 See Canon & Kolson, Rural Compliance with Gault: Kentucky, A Case

Study, 10 J. F,.. L. 800 (1971). The Kentucky authors called the appointment or
presence of counsel a "kiss of death."
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the criteria it collected were in direct conflict with juvenile court
philosophy. 77 The same is true for all but one of the eleven factors
collected by the U.S. Children's Bureau. The only non-conflicting
criterion centers on the concern for the likelihood that the procedures, services and facilities available in the adult court might
be more appropriately suited to the reasonable rehabilitation of
the child and the safety of the public. If juvenile court decisions
are to be consistent with juvenile court philosophy, this is the
only reason of all those collected which maintains the integrity
of the juvenile court by its concern for the rehabilitation of the
78
child.
While the rehabilitative orientation of the one factor which
had at least theoretical validity makes it consistent with traditional
juvenile court philosophy and potentially a justifiable criterion
for transfer, an analysis of the persistent realities of modern adult
criminal processes and correctional programs destroys any credibility or attraction it might otherwise possess. Criminal courts
generally have few, if any, rehabilitative resources superior to
those of the juvenile court.79 Their facilities and programs are
under continuing national indictment as anti-rehabilitative schools
of crime.8 ° Further, adult procedures and sanctions may damage
beyond repair the child's potential for a life of useful and constructive citizenship."' A juvenile court's interest in a child's
rehabilitation will rarely, if ever, be served by sending that child
to adult court. No matter how poorly the goal of rehabilitation
is achieved by some juvenile courts, it is generally an improvement
on most options available within the adult system. This means
that juvenile courts cannot be content to live with justifications
which do harm to the children they serve. As one author has all
too pointedly stated:
When the juvenile court washes its bands of a child, it throws
him on the scrap-heap of prison and gains nothing by employing euphemisms to describe this tragedy. On the contrary,
77 Advisory Council of Judges, supra note 10, at 5.
78 The contribution of Sargent & Gordon, supra note 10, Buss, supra note 10,
and Canon & Kolson, Rural Compliance with Gault: Kentucky, A Case Study, 10 J.
F m. L. 300, 319 (1971), show the outer limits of inconsistency employed in
justifying the transfer decision.
79 Sargent & Gordon, supra note 10, at 124.
80
Id. at 126.
81

Schornhorst, supra note 10, at 586-87.
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it loses a great deal. As long as the juvenile court practices the
self-deception that allows it to believe in the existence of
facilities "elsewhere," it will not face squarely the need to
develop for itself the tools it requires to care for these children.82
Since there is little to justify a belief that the adult system can
handle the rehabilitative mission of the juvenile court, the one
seemingly valid reason for transfer must be discounted as a serious
justification for sending children to criminal court.
The other reasons noted are also deserving of attention and
response. To those who opine that some children are not children,
it might well be asked what they consider the test of maturity.
Is it physical or emotional maturity, or both? A clinical diagnosis
purporting to answer this question would be subject to skepticism,
because:
...
it is doubtful that competent clinicians could be found
who would be willing to devise a test whose purpose was to
find out whether a child is "mature" enough to be tried in
criminal court and sent to prison. Many clinicians believe
that, in view of the present state of our penal system, no adult,
let alone a child, should be sent to prison.8 3

What about the meaning of "hopeless" when it is used to
describe a child sent to criminal court? It probably means, in
reality, that the child cannot or has not responded to previous
rehabilitative measures utilized by the juvenile court. If this is
the case, it would be better to re-evaluate the measures than to
call the child "hopeless." More than likely, nothing was ever
done for the child which was geared to help him become socially
rehabilitated. Nevertheless, when the juvenile court feels it has
exhausted its alternatives on the child, it often dumps him into
the adult system and expects the criminal court to complete its
job. 4 If the juvenile court is powerless to help, then what can
the criminal court do? If the community offers no help to the
juvenile court, will it offer more to the criminal court?
Disposing of other factors, it might be said that the likelihood
of a prolonged or difficult hearing does not justify transfer be82 Sargent & Gordon, supra note 10, at 125.

Id. at 123.
84 Id. at 128-24. See also Advisory Council of Judges, supra note 9, at 7.
83
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cause the juvenile judge should be as qualified as the criminal
judge to conduct a full hearing on issues of fact. 5 Transfer as a
punishment for a child's attitude cannot be justified, because
adolescence is marked by numerous attitudes which are at
variance with the predilections and expectations of adult society.
Considered alone, it is a very questionable index of criminal
maturity. The court exists to rehabilitate and help every child it
can, and it is antithetical to the tenets of the juvenile court tradition to send a child to criminal court because of his attitude. The
same may be said of a threat of waiver for any purpose, i.e., forcing a child to give up his rights to plead guilty."6
Likewise, to abandon a child just because he commits a single
very serious offense 7 or breaks the law after being in an institution
is contrary to juvenile court philosophy, because the court is
rejecting both the child and any further attempts to help him.
Such rejection implies the inadequacy either of judicial personnel
or of court resources, and it is the child who suffers for their
deficiencies. Of all the factors collected by the U.S. Children's
Bureau, none of them taken by itself or in combination with
others is sufficient to transfer the child as long as he can be helped
within the juvenile courtsystem. A realistic concern for the child's
rehabilitation must buttress any decision to send a child to
criminal court.
These expressed reasons for waiver do not stand up well under
a scrutinizing test for integrity, and they constitute a troublesome
deviation from consistent juvenile court philosophy at the most
critical stage of the court's processes. There are other reasons
which probably more accurately tell the story. These are not
always expressed, but they undoubtedly include discrimination
on the basis of class and color,88 public pressure and judicial85 This is hardly the case in Kentucky, since about 90 percent of the juvenile
bench possesses no legal training whatsoever. KENTucrY CRnmm CoiMssroN, DELINQUENCY IN KENTUCKY 68 (1969).
The ramifications of this situation are discussed in Canon & Kolson, Rural Compliance with Gault: Kentucky, A Case Study,
10 J. FAm.L. 300 (1971).
86 For an article which seems to espouse the use of transfer and confinement
in an adult institution as a threat, see Haviland, supra note 10, at 321.
87 Actually, the serious "one-shot" offender may be more responsive to treatment than the habitual thief whose offenses are so common that they go unnoticed.
Comment,
12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 424, 440-41 (1968).
88
Bazelon, supra note 10, at 876-77, and Note, 59 KY. L.J. 719 (1971), supra
note 10, at 732.
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political manipulation and capitulation,8 9 hostility to the presence
of counsel,0 0 and other unarticulated reasons for abandoning a
child to the criminal justice system." It has even been suggested
that children are sometimes transferred because the court needs
a scapegoat for itself and for the community.92 The basic elements
of this method of transfer are revenge and displacement of guilt,
i.e., no one wants the child to get away with what others have
had to repress, and anyway, the child has not cooperated or been
successfully rehabilitated by previous court dispositions.9 3
Those who proffer the psychological motivations of revenge
and displacement of guilt as over-riding influences in the transfer
decision also suggest that:
precisely these unconsciously motivated elements produce
effects that account for many of the inconsistencies and
ambiguities of juvenile court procedure. Perhaps they may
94
be responsible for some of the treatment "failures" too.
...

Practices inconsistent with juvenile court philosophy and ambivalent attitudes toward children the court is supposed to help
may well be motivated by the existence of these unconscious
inclinations at all levels of the juvenile justice system. Understanding the motives might make the inconsistencies and indiscretions more susceptible to resolution.
For whatever reasons a decision to transfer is made, it is
certainly clear that:
...broad criteria leave much to the discretion of the juvenile
judge. On the one hand, nebulous guidelines give the juvenile
judge the freedom to decide each case on its individual
merits. The judge is free to consider any and all information
that anyone brings to his attention, and he may be in a good
position to consider the needs of each particular child. On the
other hand, such broad discretion puts the judge in a position
89 Sargent & Gordon, supra note 10, at 125. Note, 59 Ky. L.J. 719 (1971),
supra note 10, at 732; Comment, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 424, 437 (1968).
90 See Canon &Kolson, Rural Compliance with Gault: Kentucky, A Case Study,

10 J. FAm . L. 300 (1971).

91
Comment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1171, 1211-12 (1966).
92
Sargent & Gordon, supra note 10, at 125, and Comment, 40 S. CAL. L. REv.
158, 9163 (1967).
Sargent & Gordon, supra note 10, at 127.
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where it is extremely easy for him to make arbitrary decisions.
He can, for example, justify his decision to waive on the
naked finding that the interest of the state requires a prosecution. 95
It may well be the lack of such standards, rather than wanton
abuse of discretion, which allows the interests of retribution and
public protection to get more attention than they actually merit.
This leads to an unequal administration of the law and a quandary
for appellate courts which must try to decide, with the same
absence of any standards, whether a juvenile judge has acted
arbitrarily and abused judicial discretion in transferring a given
child to the criminal court." The many values to be served in
dealing with children and the rest of society must be meshed
with the overall goals of juvenile justice and incorporated into a
clear set of standards for those who administer its philosophy at
the transfer proceeding.
D. The Need for Explicit Standards in the Transfer Proceeding:
How Substance May be Added to Form
1. The Inadequacy of TraditionalStandards
The salient deficiency in all of the proffered rationales for
transfer is that they are not consistent with the basic philosophy
and purpose of the juvenile court as a major premise and point
of departure.9 7 If the raison d'etre of the juvenile court is to rehabilitate children who come into contact with the law, then
none of the other reasons collected here are significant or in
harmony with juvenile court philosophy if a child can be helped
and socially rehabilitated by the processes and resources of the
juvenile court.
Commentators writing close to the time of Kent picked and
chose from the standards revealed by the surveys and proposed
one or a number of them as guides to be used by judges in the
transfer proceeding. The Advisory Council of Judges of the
95 Mountford & Berenson, supra note 10, at 64.
96 Comment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1171, 1209 (1966).
9
same thing can be said of most of those set forth in the Appendix to

Kent. The value of the Kent case, however, was to focus on the critical nature of
the transfer proceeding and demand that certain standards be met. The result was
that counsel, courts, and legislators started thinking about how to make transfer
proceedings consistent with juvenile court philosophy. See note 10 supra.
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National Council on Crime and Delinquency proposed that three
criteria should be considered in the waiver decision. These were
(1) the prior record and character of the minor, his physical and
mental maturity, and his pattern of living; (2) the type of offense,
i.e., whether it demonstrated viciousness or involved force or
violence; and (3) the comparable adequacy and suitability of
facilities available to the juvenile and criminal courts. 9 Others
suggested longer lists including (1) psychological and educational
rehabilitation programs which might be helpful, (2) the child's
record, noting that length does not necessarily mean he cannot
be helped, (3) the motives and attitudes of the youth as well
as his participation in past offenses, (4) whether or not the child
supports himself with the proceeds of crime or is merely a thrillseeker, (5) whether the child is a follower or an instigator, (6)
whether the crime was accompanied by exceptional violence, (7)
whether the child is a threat to others, (8) whether it was a crime
against a person or property, one against a person being more
heavily weighed, (9) whether the child was responsive to
former rehabilitative programs, (10) whether the child has ever
been committed to the state-if not, transfer would be almost
impossible, (11) the family background, (12) the child's age,
(13) his overall maturity, (14) his degree of sophistication, (15)
whether the child needs institutionalization or probation, and
(16) the strength of the prosecutor's case. 9 Still other writers
have added that the court must not only consider what the child
did, but why he did it, before transfer can be considered.' °
It has been suggested that the problem with these proposed
criteria is that their use is very often based on a lack of information compounded by random selection in the absence of a clearly
articulated guiding principle. There is a great need for research
into the nature and interconnections of these factors because
judges and others are now proceeding on the basis of too many
false assumptions. 1 1 The point of departure for this investigation,
which will touch the consistency of juvenile court philosophy as
much as the findings of modern day science, might well be the
proposition that all standards previously articulated are merely
08

Advisory Council of Judges, supra note 10, at 7.
09Note, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 281 (1967), supra note 10, at 314-16.

100 Mountford & Berenson, supra note 10, at 62.

11oSchornhorst, supra note 10, at 606.
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subparts of a much larger and more critical question which in
fact embodies the sole criterion upon which the consideration
of transfer can be based. It is only by asking this crucial question
and giving a subservient role and perspective to traditional standards that the integrity of the juvenile court can be preserved at
the transfer proceeding.

2. The Emerging Standard of Amenability to Treatment and
Rehabilitationwithin the Juvenile Justice System
Juvenile court philosophy, the doctrine of parens patriae, and
the care and treatment intended by juvenile court legislation
demand that the court address itself to the single question of

whether the child is amenable to treatment and rehabilitation
within the juvenile justice system and according to the tenets of
juvenile court philosophy.102 Others have suggested that a second
question be added, viz., whether the juvenile system has the
necessary means of treatment,'10 3 but that element could provide a
convenient subterfuge for those jurisdictions who choose to provide only the most meager resources for treatment and rehabilitation. This would result in a test which would see almost every
older child submitted to the criminal justice system. The criterion
most consistent with the principles upon which the court stands
is simply whether the child can be helped with rehabilitation
rather than retribution. If it is established that he can be so
rehabilitated, then it is up to the courts to order appropriate care
and treatment for him rather than allow him to be sent to criminal
court. There is simply too much room for compromise in the
viewpoint that:
...juvenile court is a court of law charged, like other agencies
of criminal justice, with protection of the community against
threatening conduct. Rehabilitation of offenders through
individualized handling is one way of providing protection,
and appropriately the primary way in dealing with children.
But the guiding consideration for a court of law that deals
with the threatening conduct is nevertheless protection of the
community. The juvenile court, like other courts, is therefore
102 Note, 67 COLT M. L. REv. 281 (1967), supra note 10, at 817. This gives
a child up to the age of 21 to be rehabilitated according to KRS § 208.200(1).
103 Croxton, supra note 10, at 8.
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obliged to employ all means at hand, not excluding incapacitation, for achieving that protection. What should distinguish
the juvenile from the criminal courts is their greater emphasis
10 4
on rehabilitation, not their exclusive preoccupation with it.

Under such an interpretation of the nature of the juvenile court,

it would be all too easy to use the criminal court as a standard
against which the resources of the juvenile court were measured.

Adherence to juvenile court philosophy could then be justified
as long as juvenile programs placed "greater emphasis" upon
rehabilitation than those in criminal court. Parenspatriae does not

mean greater emphasis; it means dedication to a principle that
children are to be helped and rehabilitated and that this is the
overwhelming and foremost concern of the court charged with
that task. In that work, reliance cannot be placed merely on what

is at hand. The courts must be always looking for and shaping
new forms of assistance and care. This is especially true where
the serious youthful offender is concerned, and it will serve no

one to merely try to do more than is being done in the criminal
courts.

3. Elements Necessary for an Honest Appraisal of a Child's
Amenability to Treatment
The phrase "amenability to treatment" is just as susceptible
to subjective interpretation and subsequent abuse as the older
standards used to make the decision on transfer of jurisdiction.

Consequently, it must be looked upon not as a test in itself, but
rather as a concept which organizes and unifies the philosophy

of the juvenile court at its most critical stage and objectifies a
standard against which other factors relative to the child's situation
can be judged. Courts may then ask: Does the child's age make
him unable to be helped by the juvenile justice system; or does
104 Schornhorst, supra note 10, at 593. Compare this view of the court with
that expressed in text accompanying notes 8 and 16 supra. Compare this view of
the court with those expressed in text accompanying notes 8 and 16 supra.
Clearly, the words chosen to explain the court's purpose can be very influential
in the way the court itself is administered. The Schornhorst definition seems to
be a considerable departure from the long tradition which has made the "best
interest of the child" the paramount concern of the court. E.g., Peyton v. French,
147 S.E.2d 739 (Va. 1966). Schornhorst does find support, however, in Mikulovsky v. State, 196 N.W.2d 748 (Wis. 1972). It might be suggested that as long as
juvenile courts continue to rely on this sort of reasoning they will not be able to
confront the serious issues involved in the problems of finding methods to rehabilitate young offenders. The "merely greater emphasis" idea is just too inviting a subterfuge for avoiding the responsibilities of the court.
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the offense, his attitude, the ages of his associates or the fact
that they will be charged in criminal court, his past record, his
family background, the availability of evidence sufficient for an
indictment, the community's attitude toward the offense and the
child, or the need for a scapegoat indicate that the child cannot
be helped within the confines of juvenile court philosophy?
Neither these nor other very pertinent questions can be properly
asked or answered in the absence of some formality because
broad general statutes, originally drafted with parens patriae as a
backdrop, today need strict procedural rules to form a framework
into which the substance of parens patriae can be poured. This
is especially true of the transfer proceeding. 10 5
This formality has both procedural and testimonial aspects.
It has been suggested that procedural formality would be served
by (1) specific notice to the child as to the kind of proceeding
faced, so that preparation and evidence can go to the issue of
transfer rather than adjudication; 10 (2) a separate investigation
and hearing, prior to any adjudication of delinquency, confined
to the question of the child's amenability to treatment within the
juvenile system; (3) adequate legal representation both for the
court officers and the child; (4) a limitation of evidence to that
which is relevant to the question of amenability to treatment; (5)
evidentiary and procedural safeguards sufficient to assure a proper
and reliable judicial finding; (6) provision for different judges in
waiver and adjudicatory hearing, at least when requested; and (7)
prohibition of any prosecution once the juvenile court has decided
to adjudicate the case. 0 7 Such protections would more clearly
define the proceedings, protect the child in accordance with
juvenile court philosophy, and reduce confusion with regard to
the issue of double jeopardy. 10 8
Testimonial formality can be implemented by requiring a
detailed investigation into the child's amenability to treatment
supra note 10, at 220.
106 Id. at 214. A failure to give such notice may be sufficient to overturn any
105 Note, 22 DaKxE L. REv. 213 (1972),

transfer of jurisdiction which ensues. Reed v. State, 188 S.E.2d 392 (Ga. 1972);
State v. Gibbs, 500 P.2d 209, 215-16 (Idaho 1972); and State v. Halverson, 192
N.W.2d 765 (Iowa 1971).
107 Courtade, supra note 10; Schornhorst, supra note 10, at 599; Comment, 12
= L.J. 157-58
ST. Louis U.L.J. 424, 462 (1968); and Comment, 5 Wu.im
(1968).
108 See note 171 infra.
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and rehabilitation. This is crucial to a determination of the
transfer question and becomes a paramount necessity because:
[t]he prime intention of the juvenile court movement in this
country was to have and rehabilitate the youthful offender
so as to mold him into a socially constructive citizen rather
than subject him to the deleterious features of the criminal
process. Therefore, since treatment is provided within the
statutory scheme, it seems only reasonable that the juvenile
has a right to an investigation to determine his amenability
to treatment.109
Since the decision to transfer involves a judgment that the child
is incompatible with the juvenile system, it is extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to reach this conclusion without a presentation
and testing of all relevant evidence. A proper hearing and
detailed investigation are therefore indispensable to the decisionmaking process where transfer of jurisdiction is under consideration. Statutes which still provide that the decision to transfer
shall be made only after an investigation, but are silent as to the
nature of the investigation and the manner of conducting it, are
inadequate to meet the demands of statutory due process which
is consistent with juvenile court philosophy. Courts can no longer
be allowed to consider the investigation as merely an administrative function to be done in any way they see fit, if it is done at
all."10
An investigation equal to the task of serving as the basis for a
decision on whether to transfer a child to criminal court has two
main components. One might be called the general informational
component which provides data on age, family background, prior
contacts with the court or official agencies, education, employment, the nature of the presently alleged offense, and other indicia
which are a matter of record. The other component might be
loosely called the scientific component because it informs the
court about the prospects for the child's treatment and rehabilita109 Comment, 16 ST. Louis U.L.J. 604, 616 (1972). The Kent court agreed
with this proposition and many others have followed that leadership. Kent v.
United States, 883 U.S. 541, 553 (1966). States agreeing with this principle are
found in note 24 supra. It is discussed from a defense standpoint in Comment, 12
ST. Louis U.L.J. 424, 439 (1968).
11o Comment, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 424, 427, 440 (1968).
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tion. The former category of information is restricted to a fairly
routine collection of records, while the latter must use this same
information in conjunction with other subtle investigations of the
child's inner life, dispositions, and potential in order to develop
an opinion on the crucial question of whether the child can be
helped by the juvenile court.
The diagnosis and prognosis of a child's amenability to treatment is delicate work, to say the least. Even where treatment is
concerned, diagnosis during the early stages is very tentative
and may be proven or disproven during the course of treatment.
Prognosis is, therefore, even more tentative, and one is forced to
conjecture about how any prognosis can be entertained in the
absence of diagnosis and treatment. Both develop and change
over a period of time with the intake of new data. They do not
remain constant. However, behavioral scientists have, as one
writer put it, "duped" everyone into believing that they can perform both these feats with certainty and almost on the spot."'
It is perhaps more reasonable to agree with those professionals
who say that:
Although we often brand patients as "untreatable" with apparent aplomb, such matters reduce themselves to questions of
what treatment means, definition of agency function, motivation, and other practical considerations. 112
Caution about undue reliance on science has therefore been
voiced in some quarters,1 3 while optimistic confidence is expressed in others." 4 The optimists point out that they can help
determine the child's potential for rehabilitation, as well as his
background and whether the offense was committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner." 5 The conservatives, whose candor fosters credibility, say that class differences between the
child and the psychodiagnostician, the generally disorganized
style of the offender as opposed to the organization of testing,
III Croxton, supra note 10, at 9.
112 Id.
&D

"13 Harari & Chwast, Class Bias in Psychodiagnosis of Delinquents, 10 Cnmm
LINQUENCY 145 (1964), and Croxton, supra note 10.
i4 Hayes & Solway, supra note 10.
"i5 Id. at 709-11.
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and the low verbal and imaginative skills of the youth pose great
problems to those who work with children from the juvenile
court. :

6

How he perceives and interprets a given piece of behavior
will depend to a great degree on who he is, his own life experience, his value system, and most importantly, perhaps, where
he received his training, and within which theoretical system
he operates. Today there are a vast variety of such systems
and methods which, more or less, contain their own esoteric
vocabulary and frame of reference. The proponents of each
claim success though each interprets behavior differently.
To subject a behavioral scientist to a rigorous cross examination is not merely to question his data collection system and
his facts, but also to question all of his basic theoretical
117
assumptions for which he has very little empirical data.
In view of these variables which have so much impact on the
conclusions reached about the child's amenability to treatment,
the law would do well to recognize that it is virtually impossible
to predict that any child cannot benefit from proper treatment
within the juvenile system." 8 The child should be given the benefit of the doubt raised by the diagnostic-prognostic dilemma of
science vis-a-vis the question of his "treatability." Needless to
say, findings and conclusions should be subjected to the most
rigorous examination and analysis. Several opinions might well
serve this end, together with the probing of competent and
informed counsel.
The court's probation and social rehabilitation functions
should likewise be examined carefully, because the juvenile court
often merely wants to abandon children by transferring them to
criminal court. There should be a detailed investigation of the
child's past treatment. What was its nature? How frequently
were efforts made to work with him? Was he really given a
chance to "resocialize," or was he placed on probation or in a
training school and then forgotten? What was done for him when
he returned home from a juvenile institution? How well has the
116 Harari N Chwast, Class Bias in Psychodiagnosisof Delinquents, 10 CRnmM
& DELINQUENCY 145 (1964).
1178 Croxton, supra note 10,

at 8.
1" See Comment, 12 ST. Louis U.LJ. 424, 457 (1968).
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state comported itself and looked after the child while standing
in loco parentisto him?" 9
No stone should be left unturned in the search for information
to assist in making the decision on whether to transfer jurisdiction
over a child, and no matter which factors are considered, they
must always be held up to the only standard which is consistent
with the philosophy upon which the court is predicated: is the
child amenable to treatment and rehabilitation within the juvenile
justice system and according to the tenets of juvenile court
philosophy?

IV.

AN ANALYsIs OF Tm TRaNsFER OF

JURSDICTION UNDEM KENTUCKY LAW

A. Introduction
The preceding discussion should be of special interest to those
involved in enacting, interpreting, and administering Kentucky's
juvenile laws, inasmuch as the Commonwealth's transfer law
suffers from almost every defect it catalogues. It was enacted over
ten years ago and has yet to be revised or interpreted to incorpo-

rate the recent developments which have taken place in the
United States Supreme Court, the Kentucky Court of Appeals,

precedents fr6m other jurisdictions, and the extensive legal
literature which has grown up around the transfer question.
The statute is presently taken at face value, literally construed,
and used in a way that often disregards the child's rights and the

court's responsibilities under juvenile court legislation.
Local precedent has done little more than establish that the
transfer of jurisdiction is a critical stage of juvenile court litigation

which demands that the child be represented by counse' 20 and
119 Schomhorst, supra note 10, at 605. There is not enough attention given to
the shortcomings of court probation programs and state care for committed children,
especially when they return from institutional treatment. They are generally
abandoned when they are most in need. This is a particularly vulnerable spot in
the services provided by the Kentucky Department for Human Resources. The overall crisis in good programs was candidly noted in the case of In re Patterson, 499 P.2d
1131 (Kan. 1972). The court was faced there with a serious dilemma which had
been brought about by the state's failure to provide proper programs for children
subject to its care.
120 Smith v. Commonwealth, 412 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Ky. 1967). The Kentucky
Court of Appeals gave no other reason than the Kent decision for its holding in
Smith, and one commentator has observed that".., in the absence of a definitive
(Continued on next page)
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afforded the benefits of strict adherence to the statutory procedures established for the transfer of jurisdiction. 121 The recent
case of Whitaker v. Commonwealth122 provides a ray of hope that
the substance of the transfer proceeding will come under increasing scrutiny by the Court of Appeals, but until the issues involved
in the transfer of jurisdiction are fully understood by those concerned with the administration of juvenile justice in Kentucky,
it is doubtful that the proper issues will ever be raised with consistency in any court.
B. Two ProceduralPerspectives of the Transfer Proceeding
KRS § 208.170(1) provides for two basic kinds of hearings on
the transfer question. 123 On the one hand, the proceeding can be
considered a normal juvenile court hearing on the facts in which
"transfer of jurisdiction" is one possibility among the dispositions
available to the court. This is probably the best way to handle
the hearing because no child should be referred to circuit court
unless the juvenile court is certain that the child in fact committed
the offense alleged. It would be inconsistent with the spirit of
juvenile law to subject a child, who is only probably guilty of
the alleged offense, to adult processes and penalties. The child
who is only probably guilty has not yet been shown to need any
assistance from the court, much less that he is beyond its rehabilitative philosophy. Hence, there should be a hearing on
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

statement by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the assumption must be made that
Smith somehow absorbed the entire holding of Kent, and future Kentucky juvenile
court waiver proceedings must conform to the standards announced therein."
1967-68 Kentucky Court of Appeals Review, supra note 10 at 363. As it turned
out, the Smith decision had almost no effect on the way tIese proceedings were
handled. This is exemplified by the recent case of Whitaker v. Commonwealth,
479 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1972).
•
121 Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 479 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1972); Smith v. Commonwealth 412 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1967); Benge v. Commonwealth, 346 S.W.2d 311
(Ky. 1961); Young v. Knight, 329 S.W.2d 195 (Ky. 1959); Heustis v. Sanders,
320 S.W.2d 602 (Ky. 1959); and Edwards v. Commonwealth, 94 S.W.2d 25
(Ky. 1936).
122 479 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1972). This case held that the juvenile court must
set forth "sufficient reasons" for the transfer of jurisdiction. It did not however,
give any hint as to what those reasons might be. It can be argued, therefore, that
if Smith incororated Kent, the standards, or factors, are those announced in the
appendix to the Kent decision. Under present Kentucky law, it would seem that
the "sufficient reasons" standard establishes a case by case approach devoid of any
objective guidelines for the general education and utilization of the juvenile courts
in the state.
123 This is discussed to some extent in Comment, 9 NArukar. REsouncEs J.
310, 314 (1969).
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the facts.'24 Waiver, or transfer, could then be treated as a disposition pursuant to KRS §§ 208.060(4), 208.140(1), and 208.190.
This sort of procedure would make the provisions of KRS §
208.170(2) much more useful and logical than they are at the
present time.
The transfer proceeding can also be looked upon simply as a
hearing to decide whether there is probable cause sufficient to
warrant the transfer of a certain child of a certain age, charged
with a certain offense, from juvenile court to circuit court. The
implications for adequate preparation and representation by
counsel are obvious. This would be a completely different hearing
from the one described above, and a lawyer faced with a possible
transfer proceeding should immediately make a motion that the
court and prosecution decide about the possibility of transfer.
An attorney cannot adequately prepare such a case unless he
knows what sort of hearing will take place. In this instance, no
full hearing on the facts would be required; and the offense would
not have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It would be
basically a probable cause hearing at which a decision for or
against transfer would be made.
Some attorneys prefer to bypass both of these alternatives and
simply move that the case be transferred to the grand jury. They
do this for the understandable reason that they will either come
away with no indictment, or, if one is returned, they hope to get
a better ruling on the relevant law from the circuit judge. This
is a legitimate tactical assumption for an attorney who has a
serious case and wants to rely on the legal training of the circuit
judge for a ruling on a technical point of law.' 25 There seems to
124 There is considerable merit to this approach, as was pointed out in Note,
67 CoLum. L. Rt . 281 (1967), supra note 10, at 318. It tends to aid in a
decision-making process more in accord with the philosophy of the court than
one based simply on a probable cause proceeding at which the question of the
child's amenability to treatment within the juvenile justice system is also in issue.
125 Only about 10 percent of Kentucky s juvenile judges have any legal training and there is a serious problem when it comes to ruling on the law, if indeed the
law is even observed. Compare the findings in KETucav Cum Co!va issimON, DELnQUENCY rN KENTucKY 63 (1969) and Canon & Kolson, Rural Compliance with
Gault: Kentucky, A Case Study, 10 T.FAm. L. 300 (1971), with McCune & Skoler,
Juvenile Court Judges in the United States, Part I: A National Profile, 11 Camu &
DELINQUENCY 121, 123-25 (1965), which reported that 71 percent of a national
sample of 3524 juvenile judges had earned law degrees, 77 percent were admitted
to e bar, and 50 percent had education over the LL.B. or J.D. level. This fact,
together with the typical administration of the transfer law in Kentucky, would
provide a strong motivation to seek a transfer to a higher court. The tactic is of
questionable legal validity, however.
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be reason to question the propriety of such a motion, however,
because the juvenile court cannot simply waive its duty to provide
a unique forum for the child's case nor can it compromise the
child's rights to be heard in that forum. Since granting the
motion would entail a transfer of jurisdiction to the criminal court,
the motion would have to be accompanied by a sufficient showing
that the child was beyond the control of the juvenile court and
not amenable to its rehabilitative resources and philosophy. It is
very doubtful that such a motion could ever be made or granted
in the absence of all other attendant procedures called for by
26

case law.1

Even if such a motion was legal, it would entail a calculated
risk. The case might be lost, and even if the child were probated,
a record which would follow the child through life would still be
created. The liabilities involved in having such a record have
been discussed previously, and they are good reasons why every
effort should be made to have the matter disposed of in juvenile
court. If the original inclination to move for transfer is based on
the disparity between dispositions involved in juvenile and criminal courts, the reformative course to follow would be to sue for a
proper treatment disposition under juvenile court auspices rather
than surrender the child to the rigors of adult processes.
C. Primary and Secondary jurisdiction in the juvenile and
Criminal Courts
Juvenile courts in Kentucky have been vested with exclusive,
original jurisdiction over all children except those 16 or older
127
who have been charged with a moving motor vehicle offense.
126 See note 129 infra, especially Benge v. Commonwealth, 346 S.W.2d 311
(Ky. 1961), which deals with this precise point. However, in In re Maricopa
County, Juvenile Action No. 72804, 504 P.2d 501 (Ariz. 1973), it was held that
defense counsel can waive the probable cause aspect of a transfer proceeding and
move directly to a consideration of whether or not the child should be kept under
=uvenile court jurisdiction. This would probably be valid in Kentucky, as well,

because it is the retention of jurisdiction which is the critical issue involved in

transfer. But see People v. Shaw, 279 N.E.2d 729 (1. 1972), which indicated
that a child can waive all juvenile proceedings relative to transfer and move
directly to adult court processes.
127KRS § 208.020(1)(a).

This exception is a gross inconsistency in an

otherwise good jurisdictional statute because it permits even minor moving motor
vehicle offenses to be treated as criminal offenses and the children to be fined or
ailed with adults. This would not be allowed in a case of grand larceny,
owever, because the juvenile court would have jurisdiction and the protections
of the court would obtain. This aspect of the statute should be changed because
the effects of jail and criminal sanction are the same regardless of the crime to

which they are attached.
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The acquisition of jurisdiction is governed by several statutes,12
and it has been held that the procedures for acquiring and transferring jurisdiction must be rigidly adhered to by the courts,
because the statutes governing these proceedings establish jurisdictional limitations and not mere personal rights which may be
29
waived.

1

There is no concurrent jurisdiction over a child charged with
a public offense. The juvenile court has exclusive, original jurisdiction which may only be surrendered by an act of discretion
which has been circumscribed by statutory and constitutional prescriptions. There is no requirement that jurisdiction ever be transferred to the circuit court. The circuit court, therefore, has only
limited and secondary jurisdiction which depends upon proper
steps having been taken in the juvenile court to effect the transfer
of jurisdiction over the child. Jurisdiction is not to be presumed
to obtain in the circuit court, but must be affirmatively established
by the record of the hearing in juvenile court. 30
These rigid procedural requirements will be meaningless to
128 KRS § 208.020(1) (a); KRS § 208.060; KRS § 208.070; KRS § 208.110;
KRS §29208.140; KRS § 208.170; KRS § 208.190.
1 Benge v. Commonwealth, 346 S.W.2d 311 (Ky. 1961), makes this precise
point. The requirement of rigid adherence to statutory procedure is also found in
Smith v. Commonwealth, 412 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1967); Young v. Knight, 329
S.W.2d 195 (Ky. 1959); Heustis v. Sanders, 320 S.W.2d 602 (Ky. 1959); and
Edwards v. Commonwealth, 94 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1936).
130KRS § 208.170(1) is permissive, and this fact was observed in Smith v.
Commonwealth, 412 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Ky. 1967). The nature of the respective
jurisdictions is discussed in Heustis v. Sanders, 320 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Ky. 1959),
and the need for an affirmative showing of propriety in the juvenile court pointedly
reiterated in Gipson v. Commonwealth, 226 S.W.2d 758 (Ky. 1950). These
problems came up in various ways in the cases of Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 479
S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1972); Benge v. Commonwealth, 346 S.W.2d 311 (Ky. 1961);
Young v. Knight, 329 S.W.2d 195 (Ky. 1959); Heustis v. Sanders, 320 S.W.2d 602
(Ky. 1959); Childers v. Commonwealth, 239 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1951); Robinson v.
Kieren, 216 S.W.2d 925 (Ky. 1949); Mauk v. Commonwealth, 104 S.W.2d 955
(Ky. 1937); Crawford v. Commonwealth 95 S.W.2d 12 (Ky. 1936); Edwards v.
Commonwealth, 94 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1936); Wooten v. Commonwealth, 75 S.W.2d
556 (Ky. 1934); Watson v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. 1933); Grise v.
Commonwealth 53 S.W.2d 362 (Ky. 1932); Ashley v. Commonwealth 33 S.W.2d
614 (Ky. 19305; Angel v. Commonwealth, 21 S.W.2d 150 (Ky. 19295; Tipton v.
Commonwealth, 298 S.W. 990 (Ky. 1927); Goodfriend v. Commonwealth,
288
S.W. 330 (Ky. 1926); Cloyd v. Commonwealth, 278 S.W. 595 (Ky. 19 2 ) Cody
v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W. 970 (Ky. 1925); Harman v. Commonwe li, 263
S.W. 733 (Ky. 1924); Clark v. Commonwealth, 256 S.W. 398 (Ky. 1923);
Compton v. Commonwealth, 240 S.W. 36 (Ky. 1922); Johnson v. Commonwealth,
195 S.W. 818 (Ky. 1917); Waters v. Commonwealth, 188 S.W. 490 (Ky. 1916);
and Talbott v. Commonwealth, 179 S.W. 621 (Ky. 1915). The simple conclusion
to be drawn from these cases is that there must be proper proceedings in juvenile
court before the circuit court can ever acquire jurisdiction.
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the child, however, unless they are complemented by serious substantive considerations undertaken within the confines of the
court's jurisdiction and relative to the decision on whether to
transfer the child to criminal court.
D. The Predicatesof Transfer

1. Age and Offense
Kentucky has a judicial form of transfer which is generally invoked according to jurisdictional rather than dispositional inclinations.' 31 These factors spell out an operational
format which provides for a very uneven administration of the
law. The basic reference is KRS § 208.170(1), which states that:
If, during the course of any proceeding in the juvenile court,
it appears to the court that there is reasonable cause to believe
that a child before the court has committed a felony, and, at
the time of commission of the offense, the child was sixteen
(16) years of age or older, or was less than sixteen years of
age, but the offense was murder or rape, including being an
accessory to either of said offenses before the fact, and the
court is of the opinion that the best interests of the child and
of the public require that the child be tried and disposed
of under the regular law governing crimes, the court in its
discretion may make an order transferring the case to the
circuit court of the county in which the offense was committed.
No child shall be considered a felon for any purpose until
transferred to, tried and convicted of a felony by a circuit
132

court.

This subsection sets forth the bases for transfer: age, offense and,
to some vague extent, the court's opinion that the best interests
of the child and the public require a criminal trial.

The age of the child before the juvenile court has been one
of the most litigated issues in Kentucky juvenile law, and it has

been generally determined that the time of the offense rather
than the date of the hearing is controlling. The burden of estabdiscussion at HI (A) supra.
208.170(1). An uper jurisdictional age of at least 16 years is
supported by the Standard Juvenie Court Act (6th ed. 1959) and the MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.10 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The exceptions for murder
and rape are unnecessary deviations from this standard, especialy since they pertain to younger children who are much more amenable to rehabilitation.
131 See the
1.32 KRS §
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lishing age rests with the child and his representatives. 3 3 This
seems a simple enough guideline, but there are some problems
when a child attains majority" 4 between the time of the offense
and the date of the hearing, or before he is apprehended. The
recent case of Lowry v. Commonwealth'3 5 held that a circuit
court can proceed against an 18 year old person who, as a child,
committed an offense over which the juvenile court never took
jurisdiction. This is patently bad law because of the mechanism
provided for circumventing and subverting the statutory intent
that children be given the benefits of juvenile court legislation. 136
The Lowry opinion is notable for the lack of detailed policy
considerations which should have accompanied such a weighty
ruling. The cursory treatment given a rule which makes it possible to simply disregard the juvenile court and the intent of the
juvenile statute was further compounded by the fact that almost
no mention was made of the many prior cases which had clearly
held that a child's age at the time of the offense is controlling
and that the only way the circuit court can obtain jurisdiction
is by lawful transfer from the juvenile court.13' These cases are
certainly more consistent with the intent of juvenile court legislation, and they were not overruled by Lowry.
13 Robinson v. Kieren, 216 S.W.2d 925 (Ky. 1949), held with a confident

finality that the age at the time of the offense was controlling. Accord, Jones v.
Commonwealth, 282 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1955); Vanhoose v. Commonwealth, 264
S.W.2d 72 (Ky. 1954); Childers v. Commonwealth, 239 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1951);
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 176 S.W.2d 104 (Ky. 1943); Crawford v. Commonwealth, 95 S.W.2d 12 (Ky. 1936); Commonwealth v. McIntosh, 78 S.W.2d 370
(Ky. 1985); White v. Commonwealth, 47 S.W.2d 548 (Ky. 1932); Ashley v. Commonwealth, 33 S.W.2d 614 (Ky. 1930); Hall v. Commonwealth, 21 S.W.2d 799 (Ky.
1929); Eldridge v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.2d 403 (Ky. 1929); Cloyd v. Commonwealth, 278 S.W. 595 (Ky. 1925); Cody v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W. 970
(Ky. 1925); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 271 S.W. 1055 (Ky. 1925); Harman v.
Commonwealth, 263 S.W. 733 (Ky. 1924); Clark v. Commonwealth, 256 S.W.
398 (Ky. 1923); Thompson v. Commonwealth, 255 S.W. 852 (Ky. 192.3);
McQueen v. Commonwealth, 244 S.W. 681 (Ky. 1922); Johnson v. Commonwealth,
195 S.W. 818 (Ky. 1917); Fuson v. Commonwealth, 190 S.W. 1095 (Ky. 1917);
and Mattingly v. Commonwealth, 188 S.W. 370 (Ky. 1916).
'34 KRS § 2.015.
135 424 S.W.2d 841 (Ky. 1968).
136 The office of the Attorney General agreed with this rule in Ky. Op. ATT'Y
GEN. 65-68. Neither the Court of Appeals nor the Office of the Attorney General
seems to have perceived the manner in which a rule of this kind can destroy the
exclusivity and integrity of the jurisdiction given to the juvenile court. See the
discussions at III (A) supra.
137 See note 130 supra, and especially Smith v. Commonwealth, 412 S.W.2d
256 (Ky. 1967); Benge v. Commonwealth, 346 S.W.2d 311 (Ky. 1961); Heustis v.
Sanders, 320 S.W.2d 602 (Ky. 1959); Robinson v. Kieren, 216 S.W.2d 925, 928
(Ky. 1949); and Edwards v. Commonwealth, 94 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1936).
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Mattingly v. Commonwealth,138 was cited in Lowry, but the
integrity of its holding was completely passed over. The Mattingly
court had faced the jurisdictional issue of whether age at the time
of the offense or age at the time of the hearing would control,
and had answered with an opinion that was fully cognizant of
the intent of juvenile legislation. The court said:
Upon the question of jurisdiction the only point raised here
that is not concluded by former decisions of this court is the
suggestion that the age at the time of trial, rather than at the
time the crime was committed, should prevail. This suggestion, however, is, in our judgment, unsound from the very
terms of the statute as well as upon reason. The statute defines a "delinquent" child to be one who, of the ages specified,
commits any of the acts named, including the crime charged
here, and then vests in county courts of the state exclusive
jurisdiction to try such "delinquent" children. They become
"delinquent" children, by the commission of the act denounced, when the acts are committed, and the jurisdiction
then vests exclusively in the county court, which court, having thus acquired exclusive jurisdiction, cannot be ousted by
its failure to act. The very purpose of this law, as has been
declared by this court upon more occasions than one, is to
provide for the protection and care of juvenile offenders in a
humanitarian effort to prevent them from becoming outcasts
and criminals, rather than to inflict punishment for their delinquencies. To hold that the officers charged with the execution of the law may defer action until the offending child has
passed the age thus protected by the statute, and then prosecute him as a criminal, and not a juvenile, would defeat the
very purpose of the law, and cannot be sanctioned. 3 9
Although the Mattingly opinion squarely confronts the critical
problem and the open invitation to abuse raised by the Lowry
decision, Lowry still poses an obvious threat to the integrity of
the juvenile court which cannot be overlooked by those who seek
to bring the practices of the court into line with its philosophical
40
foundations.
138 188 S.W. 370 (Ky. 1916).
139 Id.at 371.
140 The same thing can be said of Koonce v. Commonwealth, 452 S.W.2d 822
(Ky. 1970), which faIoloed Lowry. The Mattingly court was much closer to the
first decades of the juvenile justice movement and much more imbued with the
philosophy which attended that reform.
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2. The Best Interests of the Child and the Public
The elements of age and offense are not nearly so important
as the opinion of the juvenile court regarding the necessity for
criminal prosecution, and it is, therefore, the end of the first sentence of KRS § 208.170(1) which becomes the focal point of the
transfer proceeding:
...and [if] the court is of the opinion that the best interests
of the child and of the public require that the child be tried
and disposed of under the regular law governing crimes, the
court in its discretion may make an order transferring the case
to the circuit court of the county in which the offense was
committed.
This part of the statute takes on a special meaning because of the
specialized nature and objectives of the juvenile court. It should
therefore be noted that Kentucky law requires a conjunctive
demonstration by the court that both the interests of the child
and the public will be served by transferring the child to criminal
court. It is practically impossible, however, to make such showing
in view of the current state of adult correctional programs and
practices. This means that if transfer provisions are going to
persist in the face of these adult institutional realities, there must
be some standards established which will guide and curb the
discretion of Kentucky judges who may now, on the face of the
law, transfer children almost at will. This type of provision raises
such problems that it has become the subject of widespread attention in legal literature and litigation in other jurisdictions. 41
In Smith v. Commonwealth,4 2 the Court made a passing reference to the required standards, but concluded that nothing could
have prevented Smith's transfer anyway. 143 There was evidently
some reconsideration in Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 44 because

there the Court said that "sufficient reasons" had to be set forth
141 See nn. 10 & 24 supra.
142

412 S.W.2d 256, 260 (Ky. 1967).

143Id. The Court's evaluation of Smiths situation is open to serious question
in view of traditional juvenile court philosophy. Its reasoning seems to indicate

either adherence to a purely jurisdictional approach to transfer proceedings, or an
approach based on a consideration of reasons which neither separately nor in
combination can point to the hopelessness of the child's rehabilitative potential
under juvenile court methods.
144 479 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1972).
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in an order transferring a child to criminal court.1 45 Once again,
the Court failed to elaborate the reasons, and once again passed
up an opportunity to put some regularity into the most critical
proceeding in Kentucky juvenile law by defining the precise con-

ditions under which a child can be transferred to criminal court
for prosecution as an adult. Where legislative standards are lacking, as in Kentucky, the Court of Appeals could derive these
important guidelines from the structure and purpose of the

juvenile justice system itself. If this task should fall to the judiciary, it should not hesitate to provide detailed and objective
criteria which can be readily used by the juvenile courts, and
which are badly needed to enhance the equal administration and
protection of the law and to provide a basis for meaningful appellate review of transfer orders.14 The same urgency can be suggested to the General Assembly if it has the opportunity to clear

up this problem area.
While Kentucky awaits these standards, the real crisis of abuse

in transfer proceedings may be mitigated to some extent by the
existing provisions and implications of KRS § 208.140 which prescribe a condition precedent to the disposition of children brought

before the juvenile court. It states that:
Before making disposition of the case of a child brought before the juvenile court, whether by petition pursuant to KRS
208.070 or by reason of having been taken into custody pursuant to KRS 208.110, the judge shall cause an investigation
to be made, concerning the nature of the specific act complained of, and any circumstances surrounding the child
145

Id. at 595.

146 This is discussed particularly well in Atkins v. State, 290 N.E.2d 441, 442

(Ind. 1972), and State v. Gibbs, 500 P.2d 209. 216 (Idaho 1972). The United
States Supreme Court has said:
Meaningful review requires that the reviewing court should review. It
should not be remitted to assumptions. It must have before it a statement of the reasons motivating the waiver including, of course, a statement of the relevant facts. It may not "assume" that there are adequate
reasons, nor may it merely assume that "full investigation" has been made.
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966). This procedure is equally incumbent upon Kentucky juvenile courts by virtue of KRS § 208.140(1), 208.190,
and the cases cited at note 121 supra, which call for rigid adherence to statutory
procedures. The only problem in Kentucky is that there is some question about
the availability of any provision by which the transfer order can be reviewed
p* or to further adult proceedings in the criminal court. It might be suggested that
Kent urged this process upon the courts or simply assumed that such an order
was inherently liable to review by some established procedure of the juvenile
courts.

KENTucKY LAw JouNAL[

[Vol. 62

which throw light on the future care and guidance which
should be given the child. The investigation shall include an
inquiry into the child's age, habits, school record, general
reputation and everything that may pertain to his life and
character. The investigation shall also include an inquiry
into the home conditions, life and character of the person
having custody of the child. The result of the investigation
shall be reported in writing to the judge previous to the
final hearing of the child's case, and shall become a part of
the record of the proceedings.
This language is augmented by the provisions of KRS § 208.190
which require that:
When a child before the juvenile court, whether by petition
pursuant to KRS 208.070 or by reason of having been taken
into custody pursuant to KRS 208.110, is found by the court
to come within the purview of KRS 208.020 the court shall
so decree and in its decree shall make a finding of the facts
upon which the court exercises its jurisdiction over the child.
If the court finds that the child does not come within the purview of KRS 208.020, the child shall be discharged and the
proceedings dismissed.
Taken together, these two subsections require that when the juvenile court exercises any jurisdiction over a child-and transferring
jurisdiction is clearly the most far-reaching power the court can
exercise-it must do so on the basis of an investigation made
into all the circumstances surrounding the child and render a
decision which both incorporates the results of that investigation
and is consistent with the rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile
court. Any other kind of decision would be a clear abuse of discretion, a failure to abide by the procedures set forth in Ghaptei
208 of KRS, and subject to reversal upon review by a higher court.
The presence of counsel, the right of access to reports and
information used by the judge in making the decision to transfer,
and the right to cross-examine the authors of such reports and
information give the child substantial means with which to challenge a potential transfer to criminal court. The role of counsel in
defending a child faced with possible adult prosecution has been
defined as one in which:
[t]he best interests of the juvenile become clear, and counsers
duty is to protect those interests. A decision to transfer is
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nothing more than an initial step in a criminal prosecution.
If the interests of society demand such action, the state must
bear the burden of proof, and counsel for the juvenile must
use all fair and honorable means to present every defense the
law of the land permits to secure for his client the benefits of
the juvenile system. His primary duty is to protect the child

by the juvenile court which is beyond its disagainst action
47
cretion.

This fairly defines the role of the defense lawyer with respect to a
transfer proceeding under Kentucky's present law because that

law clearly places the burden of justifying the transfer upon the
court itself and places the child in a position of countering the
judicial allegation that he must be handled in criminal court.
Where the transfer to criminal court is initiated by the judge, as
in Kentucky, the law should be changed to place this burden on
the prosecutor. He could then present his reasons why transfer is

needed, the child could respond, and the judge could rule.148
It also places a burden on the defense attorney to raise points
that make the court aware of the vital issues involved in a proceeding which sends a child to the grand jury and criminal court.

The complexities of the transfer proceeding and its potentially
adverse and far-reaching effects on the child make it obvious that
an attorney who represents a child faced with transfer confronts
court
a situation considerably different from a normal juvenile
1 49
it.
for
prepared
well
especially
be
must
and
proceeding
Some courts have de147 Comment, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 424, 428 (1968).
fined an active role for counsel seeking a retention of juvenile court jurisdiction
over their client-children. Haziel v. United States, 404 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir.
1968), saw this role as one where counsel seeks out a plan or range of plans
which may persuade the court that the welfare of the child and safety of the
community can be served without transferring jurisdiction. Be that as it may,
it has been held as late as 1971 that the presence of counsel at the transfer
proceeding is not important. In re Flowers, 289 A.2d 430 (Md. 1971).
148 This was held a proper allocation of the burdens at the transfer proceeding
in the cases of Rudolph v. State, 288 So.2d 542 (Ala. 1970); Seagroves v. State,
189 So.2d 137 (Ala. 1966); People v. McFarland, 95 Cal. Rptr. 369, 17 Cal. App.
3d 807 (1971); and In re Brown, 183 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa 1971).
149 If counsel cannot defend the case properly, he should say so, and that means
removing himself from the case or seeking assistance in the work of defense. It
would be unethical to follow any other course of action. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIILrTY ETmcAL CONSIDERATION 6-3 and DISCiPLINARY RULE
6-101 obligate counsel to be honest with himself, his client, and the court. One
of the big reasons for the transfers in Kentucky is that often counsel is not aware
of the law or the issues and routinely treats the proceedings as if they were
preliminary hearings in criminal court-which they emphatically are not. That
means that a lot of young defendants are receiving inadequate representation by
counsel. The Office of the Public Defender should take special note of this problem.
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The child subject to possible transfer has a special right to a
thorough investigation into his rehabilitative potential, and it is
particularly incumbent upon the court to procure al the relevant
details when the drastic action of transfer is under consideration.
The "sufficient reasons" test of Whitaker'50 means at least, in the
absence of judicially or legislatively established guidelines, that
the totality of circumstances enumerated by KRS § 208.140(1)
must render a negative prognosis vis-a-vis the child's potential for
rehabilitation. Since the juvenile judge cannot lawfully make a
decision on a child's case without such an investigation and such
information, it seems clear that KRS §208.170(1) is circumscribed
by standards already contained in KRS § 208.140(1) and that no
decision to transfer can lawfully be made when these factors,
taken within the context of the court's saving mission, indicate
that the child can be rehabilitated. The provisions of KRS §
those of
208.170(1) must therefore be read in conjunction -with
5 ' Heustis,15 2
Edwards,'
like
cases
and
208.190,
KRS §§ 208.140(1),
Benge, 53 Smith,' Kent, 55 and Whitaker' in order to arrive at
an acceptable procedural and substantive format for evaluating
the best interests of the child and the public under the current
provisions of Kentucky law. It is only when this procedure is
followed that jurisdiction can be legally transferred to the circuit
court in accordance with the requirement of rigid adherence to

statutory procedures established for the acquisition and transfer
of jurisdiction.

E. The Appealability of a Juvenile Court Decision to Transfer
jurisdictionover a Child
The gravity of the transfer situation clearly demands that
there be some way to obtain immediate review of the decision to
deprive a child of any further protections of the juvenile court
and submit him to the criminal process. Those who say adequate
protection is provided by a right to appeal from a criminal court
150 479 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1972).
'5'

152

Edwards v. Commonwealth, 94 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1936).
Heustis v. Sanders, 320 S.W.2d 602 (Ky. 1959).

153 Benge v. Commonwealth, 346 S.W.2d 311 (Ky. 1961).
154 Smith v. Commonwealth, 412 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1967).
'55
'56

Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 479 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1972).
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conviction lose sight of the fact that the child will have to forfeit
all of the special rights and protections of the juvenile court and
submit to the publicity and impersonality of the adult criminal
proceeding in order to eventually exercise that right. Even if
there is an aquittal or dismissal, the child still stands to lose a
great deal and be put through a lot of unnecessary inconvenience
and exposure. There is need for some immediate remedy to stop
the machinery of criminal justice while a review of the juvenile
court decision is sought. This is especially true under Kentucky's
available
subjective transfer processes; review must be readily
1 57
if the ends of juvenile justice are to be preserved.
There are six basic ways to challenge a defective waiver of
jurisdiction, but all are not suited to the need for immediate
review. The child may (1) make a motion to dismiss the indictment, (2) seek a writ of prohibition, (3) seek a writ of habeas
corpus, (4) appeal from a subsequent conviction in criminal
court, (5) appeal directly and immediately from the decision to
waive him to criminal court, and (6) petition for post-conviction
relief through Rule 11.42 of the Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 5 8 One might well find the child using every one of
these remedies in an effort to preserve his rights as a juvenile,
because Kentucky's present law of appeal from the juvenile court
does not clearly provide for an appeal of the transfer order, and
no legal precedent has even been set in Kentucky courts to
resolve the matter. The result is that not only does Kentucky have
a poor transfer law, but a review of the actions of the juvenile
courts which invoke that law against children is almost impossible
157 Appeal procedures in cases where the juvenile court has waived its

jurisdiction must be swift and efficient. It does little to enhance a juvenile's contention that his case should be handled in the juvenile court
if he passes the jurisdictional age limit for the juvenile courts while his
case is on appeal. Further, there is little the juvenile court can do to
rehabilitate or control an older individual. The entire rationale of the
juvenile court system is defeated if the appeal is not handled expeditiously.
Mountford & Berenson, supra note 10, at 68.
15s The problems of appeal in the juvenile courts is discussed in Comment,
13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 90 (1968); Schornhorst, note 10 supra; Mountford & Berenson,
note 10 supra. It might also be possible to enjoin certain of the administrative
actions involved in getting the child before the grand jury; e.g., sending the
transfer order to the Commonwealth Attorney or preventing the child from being
taken before the grand jury. This would be merely an auxiliary device useful in
facilitating the implementation of the procedures which will actually get the issue
of the defective transfer before a reviewing court.
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to obtain at the time it is needed. 5 9 This entire situation indicates
that Kentucky does not completely subscribe to the proposition
that children are supposed to have special rights under the juvenile
code. If they do have such rights, they ought to be able to review
every decision of the juvenile court in an effort to ensure that
those rights are protected from the abuse of judicial discretion.
It is obvious that the transfer decision, the most drastic action
available to a juvenile judge, must be subject to appellate review
prior to the commencement of any of the processes of the criminal
justice system to which the child has been transferred, if the
integrity of the juvenile justice system is to be maintained.
Kentucky's present appeal statute for juvenile courts states
that:
An appeal to the circuit court may be taken as a matter of right
from the juvenile session of the county court from all orders
and judgments whereby any infant, or other person, shall be
restrained of his liberty, or placed in the custody of any institution, or fined or punished in any manner. The appeal shall be
taken in the manner provided in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the circuit court shall, in the best interest of the
child, hear such cases as soon as reasonably possible.60
It is undecided in Kentucky whether the transfer order comes
within the definition of those juvenile court orders which may be
appealed to the circuit court. The following example may demonstrate the complex problems encountered when counsel tries to
challenge an order of transfer under the current state of the law
and indicate the need for an immediate appeal in the transfer
situation.
Suppose there is a situation in which an improper transfer is
followed immediately by a grand jury indictment, a bail hearing,
and the setting of a date for arraignment. This is not an uncommon situation, and it has happened in the space of one hour in
some Kentucky courts. The child is well into the criminal system
L59 This is especially true since the right to a trial de novo given by Kentucky's
juvenile court appeal statute is inadequate to determine the question of the
propriety of a transfer order rendered in juvenile court. The de novo aspect of
the circuit court jurisdiction on appeal should be directed, in the transfer
situation, to a new hearing on the issue of transfer or a review of the record and
order from the juvenile court. This will make transcription a necessity in the
transfer proceeding.
'GOKRS § 208.380(1) (Supp. 1972).

1973]

TRANsFER OF JURISDICTION IN JUVENILE COURT

before he can even say the word "appeal," and, if the word is
mentioned, the response is usually that the child can appeal when
the circuit court is done with him. As indicated earlier, this
belated appeal won't protect the child's rights under the juvenile
code.
If the child is poor and cannot make bail, he will be locked up
pending arraignment and trial in adult court. It is only in this
situation that the writ of habeas corpus can be pursued and the
issues raised as to the legality of the transfer order which brought
about the child's incarceration. 1' 1 If the child is out on bail, however, other avenues must be explored. The writ of prohibition
will only be useful after the indictment is handed down, and if
an appeal has not been filed, the writ may well be denied because
all the remedies at law have not been exhausted. The remedies
at law, however, are inadequate to protect the child's rights,
because if an appeal is ified on the basis of a defective transfer
of jurisdiction, it may well be docketed for hearing after the
criminal trial on the charges against the child. This could entail
time in prison before the appeal of the defect in the juvenile court
order was ever heard. Winning such an appeal would be a shallow
victory for the child because, by that time, the child would have
been totally deprived of all the rights he possessed under juvenile
court jurisdiction, and prevailing on appeal would do little to
restore them to him.
There is some hope in making a motion to dismiss the indictment, but, unless this is based on a procedural defect in the juvenile court proceedings, the chances for a favorable ruling are
slim. Indictments challenged on the basis of defects in the substance of the juvenile court transfer hearing will generally be
subject to argument before judges totally unfamiliar with the
special and technical rights which are part of the juvenile law.
While the motion to dismiss is entirely in order, chances are that
counsel will ultimately have to turn to the extraordinary remedies
of habeas corpus or a writ of prohibition in order to secure his
client's rights.
161 Robinson v. Kieren, 216 S.W.2d 925 (Ky. 1949), was a habeas corpus
roceeding to get a child out of the penitentiary to which he had been sentenced
bya circuit court after an illegal transfer from the lower court. This was much
too late to protect his rights as a juvenile. The opinion recites a typical transfer
order which is devoid of almost all the elements necessary to properly vest jurisdiction in the circuit court.
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A possible review might also be obtained through Rule 11.42
of the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure, by petitioning for
post-conviction relief from criminal sanction and incarceration.
This remedy stands at the end of a long line of possible procedural
devices, and thus is of highly questionable value where the protection of juvenile rights are concerned. However, it is one of
the three ways which has been utilized to review the adequacy
of a transfer proceeding under Kentucky law. Each of these was
highly inappropriate to handle the serious matter of protecting
the integrity of the child's right to juvenile court processes. 62
All but one of the remedies considered are either inadequate
to protect the child's rights or are extraordinary interventions in
a process which would be more efficiently, appropriately and
traditionally resolved by a simple right to immediate appeal. The
present law makes the "appear' of a transfer decision a lawyer's
nightmare because it can entail the pursuit of just about every
remedy which is available in the courts. This situation makes
it painfully obvious that Kentucky must, either by judicial
interpretation or legislative revision, provide for an immediate
appeal of the transfer decision which stops all the processes of
the criminal law until it has been decided where the child should
be tried and what rights extended to him. If transfer of jurisdiction is not an appealable order, then it makes the proceeding
little more than a preliminary hearing in adult court, the abuse
of which cannot be challenged until a criminal trial has taken
place and the child has been deprived of all his special rights
under the juvenile code.
It is inappropriate that the normal processes of the law should
have to be replaced by extraordinary remedies in order to correct
abuses or regularize procedures which could be much better
regulated by the time-honored device of appeal. Where the issue
of the appealability of the transfer order has come up in other
states, there is a definite trend in favor of making it appealable
because of its finality with regard to the juvenile court's jurisdictional concern for the child. 16 Kentucky would do well to estab162 Id.; Smith v. Commonwealth, 412 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1967) was a proceeding under Ky. R. Ca . P. 11.42; and Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 479 S.W.2d
592 (Ky. 1972) was an appeal of a conviction in criminal court.
163 Transfer orders were held appealable in: Seagroves v. State, 189 So.2d
137 (Ala. 1966); P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972); Graham v. Ridge,
(Continued on next page)
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lish a similar rule and clear up an area of juvenile law which is
presently beset with a chaos uncommon to the modem procedures
available for resolving disputes among reasonable men.'64
F. Pre-indictment Considerations
A child has no right to bail in juvenile court. 165 When he is
transferred from juvenile court, however, he gains the same right
to bail possessed by an adult. 66 This right must be guaranteed
by the juvenile court, and the child must be taken before the
circuit judge immediately after the transfer order is made so that
bail can be properly set..67 Establishing certain amounts of bail

for specified crimes, in the absence of hearings, is not permitted;
each case must be handled individually. 68 This is the manner in
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

489 P.2d 24 (Ariz. 1971); M. v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. Rtpr. 881 (Cal. 1969);
Gagliano v. State, 234 So.2d 159 (Fla. 1970); In re John Doe 1, 444 P.2d 459
(Hawaii 1968); Franklin v. State, 448 P.2d 25 (Kan. 1968); Aye v. State, 299 A.2d
513 (Md. 1973); Franklin v. State, 285 A.2d 616 (Md. 1972); Thomas v. State,
271 A.2d 197 (Md. 1970); State v. Yoss, 225 N.E.2d 275 (Ohio 1967); State ex
tel. Juvenile Dep't of Marion Co. v. Johnson, 501 P.2d 1011 (Ore. 1972); In re
Weidner, 487 P.2d 1385 (Ore. 1971); State v. Little, 407 P.2d 627 (Ore. 1965);
In re Houston, 428 S.W.2d 303 (Tenn. 1968); and State v. McArdle, 194 S.E.2d
174 (W. Va. 1973). However, such an order was held not to be appealable in
People v. Jiles 251 N.E.2d 529 (Ill. 1969); Commonwealth v. Owens, 254 A.2d
639 (Pa. 1969), and In re T.J.H., 479 S.W.2d 433 (Mo. 1972).
164 There is a lon tradition of appeal from juvenile court orders under Kentucky law. Dating back to 1932, it has provided children with a right which many
states have only recently made available. See the discussion in Joseph v. Commonwealth, 310 S.W.2d 279, 280 (Ky. 1958). This law was revised in 1972, note 160
supra but some of the older precedents seem to carry over and a ply under the
new law. For instance, jurisdictional issues can be raised for the first time in the
Court of Appeals. Wooten v. Commonwealth, 75 S.W.2d 556 (Ky. 1934); Mattingly v. Commonwealth, 188 S.W. 370 (Ky. 1916); and Waters v. Commonwealth,
188 S.W. 490 (Ky. 1916). The circuit court has no authority to even entertain an
appeal unless the juvenile court exercises its jurisdiction over the case. Wade v.
Commonwealth, 303 S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1957); Compton v. Commonwealth, 240
S.W. 86 (Ky. 1922). The appeal is considered an extension of the juvenile
procedures. Therefore, there is no right to a jury trial. Dryden v. Commonwealth
435 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1968) and Ky. Op. A7r'Y GEN. 70-701. The child shall
be tried as a juvenile and, if the appeal is lost by the child, this acts as an
affirmation of the decision made in the juvenile court. The circuit court does not
seem to have any authority to enter a new disposition. Dryden v. Commonwealth,
435 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1968); Ky. Op. A-r'y GEN. 70-701; Tunget v. Commonwealth, 320 S.W.2d 796 (Ky. 1959); and Wooten v. Commonwealth, 75 S.W.2d
556 (Ky. 1934). In view of all this precedent, there would certainly be no novelty
in extending the right to appeal to the most critical stage of juvenile court
proceedings.
165 KRS § 208.110(1) (Supp. 1972). Baker v. Hamilton, 477 S.W.2d 149
(K~y. 166
1972).
KRS § 208.170(2) (d); Ky. Op. ATT'y GEN. 72-381.
167 Ky. Op. Ar7ry GEN. 72-381.
168 Ky. Op. AT'y GEN. 72-703 was addressed to multi-county districts in
which courts do not meet continuously and grand iuries are not always in session.
This is very important because often a child is transferred while the circuit court
(Continued on next page)
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which the immediate question of bail for the transferred child is
to be resolved according to present law.
Regardless of whether he is able to post bond, the transferred
child enters an area where his legal status is not adequately
defined by present Kentucky law. This is because there are several
provisions which seem to keep his status as a child intact even
though he is in adult criminal court. The first of these is KS
§ 208.170(1) which says, in part, that no child is to be considered
a felon for any purpose until transferred to, tried and convicted
of a felony by a circuit court. This has a directly negative bearing
on the power of police and others to photograph and fingerprint
him, or create any kind of criminal record on him, until after he
has been convicted in criminal court.0 9 The second is KRS §
208.170(2) (a) which allows the grand jury to recommend to the
circuit judge that the child be committed to the Department for
Human Resources. A third provision, KRS § 208.170(2)(b), permits
the circuit judge to commit the child to the department at any
time during the proceedings in criminal court. This can also be
done according to the provisions of KRS § 199.375(2) (d). The
provisions of KRS § 208.170(2) (c) are equally inconclusive
about the child's status when they provide that if the grand jury
or circuit judge have not acted in accord with KRS § 208.170
(2) (a) and (b), then the child shall be tried as any other adult.
The judge can still stop the proceedings at any time and commit the child to the Department for Human Resources under the
provisions of KRS § 208.170(2) (b). It would seem that in view
of these several subsections, a very strong argument can be made
that a child is entirely a child until indictment, trial, and con70
viction in circuit court.1
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

or grand jury are out o session and he is forced to sit in jail, without bail, until the

next session commences. Juvenile judges set bail at times, but not always. This
opinion would curtail even that activity. It might be more realistic to give
juvenile judges the power to set bail on a transferred child. This would clear up
some hardships which are bound to occur in multi-county districts.
169 This is discussed in Ky. Op. ATr'Y GEN. 66-253 in the context of KRS §§

208.170(1), 208.110(1), 17.110(1), 17.110(2), 208.170(2)(a), (b), and (c).

The Attorney General's opinion held that elimination fingerprints and photographs

could be used to help decide the issue of delinquency in the juvenile court, but that
they were protected by the same confidentiality which surrounds all juvenile court
matters. This is discussed further in Ky. Op. ATrry GEN. 68-289.
170 Note 132 supra. It seems paradoxical that the law does not provide for a
clear status, but leaves the child to flounder in a legal limbo where he has all sorts
of rights but no protections vis-a-vis the question of his childhood. The criminal
(Continued on next page)
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These provisions are all problematical in that they entail
further decisions concerning the child's amenability to rehabilitation and the propriety of dealing with him in adult court, which
should be conclusively resolved before he leaves the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. This is an unnecessary and anomalous burden for the criminal court because it is accustomed to
operating according to means and ends different from those of
juvenile court. Nothing is gained by submitting the question of
"amenability to treatment" to a grand jury or circuit judge functioning within the context of the criminal processes. They are
deprived, as was the juvenile judge, of any standards by which
to order their opinion and will ultimately have to rely, again like
the juvenile court from which the child came, upon subjective
evaluations in determining whether to keep the child in criminal
court or remand him to the juvenile justice system.
This dilemma could be wholly resolved by providing appropriate procedures and standards for transfer proceedings, accompanied by a subsequent right to seek immediate and unencumbered review of any order of transfer wrongfully entered against
the child. While this issue remains unresolved, however, the child
and his counsel must be aware of these procedural technicalities
and the implications they have for securing the best interest of
the child by a return to juvenile court jurisdiction.
G. ProceedingsBefore the Grand Jury and Circuit Court
The discussions above settle, as far as is presently possible,
the questions of jail, bail and the nebulous status of the child as
he moves towards and through the grand jury and circuit court.
The grand jury processing is controlled by KRS § 208.170(2) (a),
which states that:
When juvenile court so transfers a case to the circuit court:
If a grand jury considers the case and is satisfied there is
sufficient evidence to indict the child, it may either return
an indictment or may return a written report to the circuit
court recommending that the child be committed to the de(Footnote continued from preceding page)

court is therefore asked to administer two different and conflicting philosophies of
justice with regard to a problem that could have been resolved by the use of objective
transfer standards in the juvenile court and the right to an immediate appeal of
the transfer order.
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partnent. If the court believes that such commitment would
be proper, it may order the child committed to the department.
It has been held that using the words "adjudged guilty" in a
transfer order does not necessarily mean that the juvenile court
(1) has found the child guilty, (2) is restricted to disposing of
the child by probation or commitment, or (3) is precluded from
transferring the child to circuit court. 7 1 It has also been held
that the juvenile court's failure to give the circuit court or its
prosecuting officers a copy of a prior transfer order before the
return of an indictment is not fatal to the circuit court's jurisdiction.17 2 Another case held that a child can be indicted and
tried only on the offense that was transferred from juvenile
court.7 3 This rule is a guard against the potential abuse of the
transfer proceeding entailed in preferring a more serious charge
against a child in order to have him transferred to circuit court,
and then reducing the charge once the child is before the superior
tribunal.
The provisions of KRS § 208.170(2) (a) pose some problems
if taken literally because they permit the recommendation of
commitment for a child against whom nothing has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. It also places a duty on the prosecuting officer to advise the grand jury that it can recommend the
child for commitment by the circuit court. If the grand jury is
not so advised, it would seem that the indictment of the child
would be invalid because the grand jury would not have been
aware of all the options pertinent to the child's case.
There is some question about the power of the grand jury
or the circuit court to refer a case, improperly before either body,
back to the juvenile court. It has been held that when a case is
improperly before the circuit court, it cannot be transferred back
'71 Lewis v. Commonwealth, 186 S.W.2d 416 (Ky. 1945).
The double
jeopardy elements of this ruling are obvious, and it is clearly a strained opinion in
view of KRS § 208.200. The degree to which the double jeopardy issue becomes
important in the case where transfer takes place after adjudication depends on the
context of the proceeding and the known liabilities at the beginning of a hearing
in which transfer is one disposition among several. See Note, 24 STAN. L. REv. 874
(1972), supra note 10, and Comment, 11 J. FAM. L. 608 (1972).
172 Baughman v. Commonwealth, 267 S.W. 281 (Ky. 1924).
173 Benge v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 311 (Ky. 1961). It might be hard
to meet the requirements of this rule in the absence of the appropriate information
from the juvenile court, especially in view of the requirements of KRS §§ 208.140(1)
and 208.190.
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to juvenile court, but must be dismissed. 7 4 This is a harsh rule
in practice because it would surely incline the circuit court to
overrule technical objections to its jurisdiction if it was without
power to remand the case to juvenile court.
The provisions of KRS § 208.170(2) (b) present the same
problems as those of subsection (2) (a). It reads:
When juvenile court so transfers a case to the circuit court:
If, during any stage of the trial in the circuit court, the child,
or his parent or guardian so requests, the judge in his discretion may stop the trial and commit the child to the department.
This again raises the possibility of commitment without proof
of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. While this might be
used to good advantage by the child who stands a chance of
being found guilty and sentenced by the circuit court, it could
result in the incarceration of an innocent child against whom no
case had been proven. It might be used to force the acceptance
of a commitment in lieu of adult trial and possible conviction,
and the liabilities imposed by a criminal record would make that
an attractive offer. In any event, it has been held that a parent
or responsible adult must request the circuit court to commit the
child under this subsection; the judge may not do it on his own
motion.

75

These two provisions present a definite possibility for abuse.
The only way they can be utilized in a manner at all consistent
with the principles of juvenile justice would be if the child were
first found, in juvenile court, to have committed an otherwise
felonious act and was then transferred to the grand jury. 76 This
format was proposed to the General Assembly in 1972 but was
rejected for reasons wholly unrelated to its substance."
When the circuit court has established its jurisdiction over
174 Commonwealth v. Franks, 175 S.W. 349 (Ky. 1915).

175 See Lewis v. Commonwealth, 186 S.W.2d 416 (Ky. 1945), and Ky. Op.
ATT'y GEN. 70-701.
176 Note that KRS § 208.170(2) (e) makes these commitments indeterminate
to the age of 21 years. This means they are civil commitments aimed at the
rehabilitation rather than the punishment of the child. They are the same as juvenile
court commitments. This being the case, the decision to commit the child is the
proper subject matter of the juvenile court and provision should be made so that
it can be fully determined in that forum.
377 S.B. 170, Ky. Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (1972).
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the child and determined whether it is going to retain that jurisdiction, the provisions of KRS § 208.170(2) (c) become effective.
The statute provides that:
When juvenile court so transfers a case to the circuit court:
If neither of the procedures specified in paragraphs (a) and
(b) of this subsection are employed, the child shall be tried
as any other defendant.
This seems to be the first point at which the child becomes an
adult in the eyes of the law. It does not mean, however, that he
cannot revert, through the judge's discretionary use of the provisions of KRS § 208.170(2) (b), to childhood and the protective
programs set for children. This is always a possibility and it
should not be lost sight of at any time during proceedings before
the grand jury or circuit court.
H. Dispositions from the Circuit Court
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has held that it is cruel and
unusual punishment to sentence a child to life without possibility
of parole. 17

The General Assembly has been similarly moved

to provide an alternative to the harshness of prison life by making
it possible, under certain circumstances, for children convicted in
circuit court to be committed to the Department for Human Resources. This can be done pursuant to KRS §208.180 which permits
unconditional commitment up to the age of twenty-one years for
children whose circuit court sentences will run out before they
reach 21, and a similar type of commitment, with subsequent
surrender of jurisdiction to the Bureau of Corrections, for
those whose sentences run beyond the age of twenty-one years.
When this law can be used, the procedures for making it as
effective as possible can be worked out between the Department
for Human Resources and the Bureau of Corrections. These are
important alternatives because they represent the child's last
78
'
Anderson v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1971); Workman v.
Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968). Ky. Op. ATr'Y GEN. 64-440 says
that the fine of a juvenile in circuit court may not be probated after a rendition of
the final judgment in that court. Ky. Op. ATr'y GEN. 40510 (1957) says that a
child placed in a juvenile institution, incident to a circuit court sentence, gets "good
time" for time spent in the juvenile institution and forfeits time if he escapes.
Since the provisions of KRS § 208.180 are seldom used, and the opinions are so
old, they are of questionable value.
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chance to be placed under juvenile justice jurisdiction rather than
in prison.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
A. Introduction
The present provisions and interpretations of Kentucky's transfer law provide demonstrably inadequate guidelines for determining whether the juvenile court shall retain jurisdiction
over the serious young offender. The criticisms of legal commentators who have addressed the transfer issue are almost
universally applicable to Kentucky, and this fact places it far
outside the circle of a growing majority of states which have
acted to bring transfer laws into line with modem developments
in juvenile court practice and philosophy. 17 The time is long
overdue for Kentucky to take similar steps to reform its law of
transfer and thereby infuse a renewed integrity into an otherwise
progressive system of juvenile justice.

B. The Inadequacy of the Tentative Provisions of the Kentucky
Penal Code
This badly needed reformation will not be served, however,
by the ill-considered provisions contained in the legislative package which constitutes the new Kentucky Penal Code.180 The
tentative amendment of KRS § 208.170 does nothing more than
establish 16 as the minimum age at which a child can be considered for transfer to the criminal courts.18' It provides neither
objective standards nor regularized procedure for determining
the critical issues involved in the transfer of jurisdiction, and the
most that can be said for it is that while it does improve the law
by taking away the power to transfer children under 16 years of
age, it should be scrapped in favor of more substantial reform.
A related section in the new penal code places part of the
transfer issue within the concept of criminal responsibility and
provides that the defense of "immaturity" shall be available to
179 See note 14 supra.

180Ky. Acvs ch,. 185, §§ 1-307 (1972) (effective 7-1-74). The proposed
revisions of Kentucky's transfer law are found in §§ 39 and 294.
181 Ky. Aars ch. 385, § 294 (1972) (effective 7-1-74). The present law sets
the same age, but provides that in the event of murder, rape, or accessory thereto, a
child under 16 may be transferred to criminal court. KRS § 208.170(1).
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every child up to the age of eighteen years who commits an
offense over which the juvenile court both takes and retains jurisdiction. 8 The Commentary to this section points out that children under 16 are not relieved of accountability for their offenses, but rather are placed under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the juvenile court for the adjudication and disposition of their
offenses. As long as juvenile court can acquire and exercise jurisdiction, the age at the time of the offense is controlling. If a
child was under 16 at the time of the offense, then he must be
treated as a juvenile when brought under juvenile court jurisdiction even though he is over 16 at the time he is charged. 3
The consistency of this provision breaks down rapidly beyond
this point, however, because if a child committed an offense when
he was less than 16 and is not charged until he is over 18, the law
would permit him to be prosecuted in criminal court simply
because juvenile court jurisdiction over the child would have
terminated at the age of 18.1-84 The Commentary seems to imply
that the child could still raise the defense of immaturity in adult
court and that the state would have to prove its absence beyond
a reasonable doubt.' 85 This would be an improvement in the
traditional law of presumptions regarding incapacity, 8 " but it
would also leave the door wide open to potential prosecutorial
abuse, such as delaying or instituting incomplete prosecutions of
known charges in order to eventually bring the child into criminal
court after the attainment of majority. The end result of practice
182 Ky. ACTs ch. 385, § 39 (1972) (effective July
88
1
KENTucKy LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH CoxassioN,

1, 1974).
KENTucKY PENAL CODE

§ 505, Commentary (Final Draft 1971).
1L84Id. at 57. There is an unexplained desire to preserve the unfortunate rule
of Lowry v. Commonwealth, 424 S.W.2d 841 (Ky. 1968), without any investigation
of its 8ramifications.
5
1

KEN-rUcKy LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH CoMmssioN, KENTucKY PENAL CODE

§ 505, Commentary, at 56 (Final Draft 1971).
186 Kentucky now uses the theologically inspired, but legally inadequate,
"7-14-21" rule and is as enamored of its mystique as most of the other jurisdictions
in the United States. Spurlock v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.2d 910 (Ky. 1949);
Thomas v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1945); and Watson v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. 1933), held that children below the age of 7 are
incapable of crime, and that those between the ages of 7 and 14 should be
acquitted of crime unless their presumed incapacity is rebutted by a showing,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that they knew what they were doing and proceeded
with the required intent. This is one of those situations over which every protection of the law should be thrown and every doubt resolved in favor of the child.
See Elmore v. Commonwealth, 188 S.W.2d 956, 961 (Ky. 1940).
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the juvenile
under this provision could considerably undermine
187
court establishment with respect to the older child.

Part of this problem can be resolved by providing that no
child will be amenable to prosecution in criminal court for any
offense which should have been within the comprehension of
reasonably circumspect and vigilant juvenile court officials at the
time he was a minor and therefore made the subject matter of
proceedings under the juvenile law. The rest of the problem must
be resolved by means other than those which simply consign the
child to criminal court because an offense he committed as a
minor is not discovered until after the attainment of majority.
The most realistic approach to this problem is simply to expand
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to cover this situation and
to give such an individual the right to traditional juvenile court
dispositions if it is established that he is amenable to a rehabilitative rather than punitive disposition. Such an individual
would be old enough to hold a job and engage in many socially
rehabilitating community activities not open to younger children
who are normally disposed of in juvenile court. The device of
probation could be used with great effectiveness in these situations, and the greater access to work and the stabilizing influence
of other required adult obligations could, when coupled with
appropriate counselling, serve in the place of the institutional
care often rendered to children. This is the lot of most of those
who are disposed of in circuit court anyway, but since the individual discussed here would be granted these benefits under the
aegis of juvenile court philosophy, he would not suffer the creation
of a criminal record, trial in circuit court, or any of the other
liabilities concomitant to the criminal process. He could be dealt
with in juvenile court under an expanded jurisdiction over young
offenders and be subject to the Bureau of Corrections during
the period of probation.
Such an expansion of jurisdiction to the age of 21 is not as
novel as it seems and would be consistent with existing provisions
of the juvenile law which allow a child to be kept under juvenile
court or Human Resources jurisdiction for treatment and rehabili187

This is discussed at II1(A) and IV(D)(1) supra.
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tation until the age of 21.188 If the law presently envisages that a
person of 20 may be under juvenile justice jurisdiction, it could
easily expand the jurisdictional purview of KRS § 208.020(1)(a) to
bring him under the juvenile court for all purposes the juvenile
court could promote without a transfer of jurisdiction to the
criminal forum.
This expanded jurisdiction would make even smoother the
transition from child to adult status relative to the correction of
public offenses. It would also pay respect to the current emphasis
on the value of providing special programs for the young adult
offender to preclude his destruction by the traditional excesses of
penal institutionalization. This would not be a very difficult
matter under the reformed scheme of rehabilitative programs
allowed by some of Kentucky's newest laws and increasingly
available through the Bureau of Corrections. These dispositional approaches are utilized even now, and all that remains
is to put them under a jurisdiction which is legally untainted
with the publicity and documentation of the traditional criminal
court.
If this ambitious project is determined to be infeasible, then
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court should at least be expanded
so that the person whose offense as a child is not discovered until
after he attains majority can still avail himself of the rehabilitative
philosophy and attendant benefits of juvenile court that he would
have had a right to as a child. If the law is not reformed in
some manner consistent with these observations, the arbitrary
prosecution of young adults for crimes they committed as children
will make a travesty of the integrity of juvenile justice and its
designated mission among the young people of Kentucky.
Those young offenders shown to be in need of penal incarceration, however, would be tried under the normal processes
of the criminal law as unfit subjects for juvenile court methodology. This could be done through the same sort of transfer proceeding which sends children to adult court.
Inasmuch as the tentative provisions of the Penal Code addresses itself to none of these questions, its proposed contributions to the reform of the law of transfer should likewise be
1881KRS § 208.200(1).
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shelved in favor of a more comprehensive revision which would
take into account all of the substantive and procedural problems
attending the critical determination of which court should hear
the child's case. This sort of formulation would have been most
appropriately included as part of the Penal Code proposals, but
an overwhelming concern about correcting the problems in the
administration of criminal justice with respect to adults resulted
in an almost complete disregard of the present juvenile law which
allows children to be inappropriately processed under adult
provisions." 9 It would seem that those who put so much effort
into the reformation of criminal programs and processes would
have been concerned that these resources be used only for those
who really need them.
This is especially true in Kentucky where there are separate

state agencies responsible for juvenile and adult offenders. The
issues of economy and duplication of services alone demand
that each agency do what it was established to do. The same
thing can be said of the juvenile and criminal courts, because
when a child is unnecessarily tried in circuit court, and even more
unnecessarily put into prison, the economy and integrity of the
administration of justice suffer along with the child. The clear
legislative intent behind the establishment of these several arms
of the administration of justice is not being given full effect by
the present mismanagement of the system which results from the
abuse of the transfer law. The Penal Code proposals do nothing
to correct this imbalanced and wasteful administrative approach.
What is needed is a provision which will not only protect the
interests of children and the public, but will also serve to curtail
the unnecessary utilization of criminal justice processes and sanctions against children who can be helped within the confines of
189 One is forced to ask about the logic behind trying to reform adult criminal
justice and reduce the adult criminal population without doing something about the
laws and problems which affect children. It is futile to continue spending money
on detection, apprehension, correction, and incarceration, while doing little about
prevention. Oddly enough, however, that is the way the spending riorities of
federal crime fighting money have been set. This is reflected across fide country,
as well as in Kentucky, by the low Crime Commission expenditures on preventive
programs for children. A possible explanation for the current approach to the
reform of criminal justice in Kentucky, vis-a-vis the juvenile court, is that it might
be necessary to reform adult corrections, the penal code, and the judiciary before
trying to figure out what to expect from a reformation of the juvenile court. It must
be hoped and urged that it does not take too long to get all of this into a proper
perspective.
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the juvenile justice system of this state. Kentucky's recent invest-

ment of time, money, and effort in revitalizing these two areas of
justice cannot now be undermined by the shortsighted formulation
of an important law.

C. An Outline of Reform
Kentucky needs a law which addresses all of the issues involved
in the transfer of jurisdiction. Such a law should contain the
following elements, in addition to the other statutory and constitutional prescriptions which already apply to juvenile proceedings:
1. The age of 16 years should be the minimum age at which
transfer of jurisdiction can be considered. This is consistent with
national recommendations and has been tentatively approved in

the Kentucky Penal Code.3

This should be amplified to provide

both that (a) no child can be charged after the age of 18 for

offenses which should have been known to and prosecuted by
reasonably circumspect and vigilant juvenile court officials during

the period of his minority, and (b) no child over the age of 18,
who is charged with an offense committed but undetected during
his minority, can be prosecuted in circuit court until he is given

the same rights he would have enjoyed as a minor had he been
adjudicated as such. This includes the same kind of transfer
190 See notes 132 and 180 supra. The element of resonsibility must be
qualified somewhat in juvenile court because of age and also ecause of the doctrine of parens patriae which is predicated in part on an aspect of incompetence
in those it shields. Accordingly, some authors report a trend to move farther and
farther away from the common law age of 7. Frey, supra note 10; Westbrook,
Mens Rea in the Juvenile Court, 5 J. Fm. L. 121 (1965). Others, however, see a
trend toward making it possible to transfer more children by placing lower age
groups and fewer crimes under juvenile court jurisdiction. They say this reflects a
concern for law and order which is coupled with a concentration on better juvenile
court services and new ways of helping children. If these better programs do not
work and prove the experiment, then it will be easier to put the children into
criminal courts. Speca & White, supra note 10. This analysis is somewhat suspect
in view of (1) the at least 32 states that have fairly strict, pro-child, transfer laws,
see note 14 supra, and (2) the continuing buildup of precedent which makes it
more and more difficult to transfer a child to criminal court if there is any hope
of helping him within the juvenile justice system. Age and offense may be
important predicates in the law of transfer, but the "amenability to treatment
test is a considerable obstacle for those law and order elements who would lock
up every child. Those who see a rise in the age limit of juvenile court jurisdiction
note that it extends even to the child accused of murder and that this indicates
that the states are beginning to show some confidence in their juvenile justice
systems and are willing to choose redemption over punishment, even with regard
to very serious crimes. See Frey, supra note 10.
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hearing available to a child, if it is felt that he may be more
appropriately dealt with according to criminal court processes.
This would resolve all the problems and abuses engendered by
the present age-at-time-of-offense or age-at-time-of-trial dilem191
ma.
2. A felony offense should be a minimum prerequisite for a
transfer proceeding. This is consistent with present law and the
tentative amendment found in the amended statutory provisions
accompanying the Kentucky Penal Code legislation. 9 ' It has
been observed that a generic categorization of "felony" often
includes crimes of minor social significance, 93 and that further,
since those children who commit crimes against property seldom
need to be locked up in a penitentiary, the transferability of a
young offender should be restricted to felonious crimes against
persons.0 4 These are matters which are inherently amenable to
the decision-making processes of the transfer proceeding, since
social or personal consequence would certainly be a factor to consider relative to the need to invoke criminal sanctions against the
offender.
3. Transfer of jurisdiction should become a disposition under
KRS § 208.200 and require a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that a child had indeed committed a felonious act. This would
make it impossible to send a child to criminal court who only
probably committed a felony and who might be determined, on
the basis of that hypothetical offense, to be beyond the rehabilitative potential of the juvenile justice system. A juvenile
court should be sure the child committed the offense before it
proceeds to abandon its jurisdiction over him. 195 Making the

transfer of jurisdiction a disposition under the present provisions
of KRS § 208.200 would also solve certain double jeopardy questions which arise when adjudications are made and the transfer
191 See the discussion and suggested resolution of this problem at IV(D) and
V(B) supra.
102
notes 182 and 180 supra. Ky. AcTs ch. 885, § 265 (1972) (effective
7-1-74) lists the various classes of felonies and the sentences attached to them.
193 Hall, Science and Morality of Criminal Law, 9 Ariz. L. REv. 360 (1968);
Kadish The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 7 AM. CRuh. L.Q. 17 (1968); and
Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal
Code, 68 COLum. L. REv. 1425 (1968).
194
See generally Schornhorst, supra note 10, at 597-98.
10 5 See text accompanying note 46 supra.
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laws then invoked.196 If it is not made a disposition, then it
should be at least given the status of a "probable cause" hearing.
This has a much more stringent legal denotation than the present
"reasonable cause" phraseology.
4. Under either format, the prosecutor, and not the judge,
should be responsible for making the motion to transfer jurisdiction. The present procedure is inherently prejudicial against
the child because the judge often signs the petition which brings
the child before the court, and then initiates and rules on the
question of transfer.
5. A separate hearing should be required to resolve issues
involved in transferring jurisdiction. This could be included
under KRS § 208.060(2) and (4) if the transfer of jurisdiction
became a disposition, or it could be specifically called for in the
event that it were merely made, in part, a probable cause hearing
at which amenability to rehabilitation was also in issue. If the
latter situation prevailed, adequate notice specifically identifying
the transfer hearing and the issues of probable cause and amena-

197
bility to rehabilitation should be required.

6. The test for transferability should be simply whether the
child can be rehabilitated before he is 21 years old or whether
the stringent measures of the criminal law will be needed for
the protection of society. The age of 21 is the maximum age of
the child over which both the juvenile court and the Department
for Human Resources can exercise jurisdiction. The catalogue of
considerations that should go into this evaluation is adequately set
forth in KRS § 208.140(1), and a detailed investigation of this
nature should be a required part of every transfer hearing. The
capacity to be rehabilitated is the critical fact which must be
demonstrated and, if it is so shown, no collection of other factors
can be sufficient to justify a transfer of jurisdiction.
7. The establishment of a right to treatment should be in196 It could be argued, under a case like Lewis v. Commonwealth, 186 S.W.2d
416 (Ky. 1945) that when a judge finds a child "guilty" in juvenil court, he is
bound by the dispositional alternatives under KRS § 208.200(1) and may not
transfer jurisdiction to criminal court. The Lewis court did not agree, and its
position can be supported by the language of KRS § 208.170(1) which provides
that a judge can elect to transfer a child at any time during the proceedings in
venile court. This situation may nevertheless be amenable to challenge on the
basis of
9 7 double jeopardy.
1
This is obviously necessary for the adequate preparation of and representation by counsel.
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eluded in the transfer law and in another section of KRS Chapter
208 as a statement of the means by which the well-defined goals
of Kentucky's juvenile justice system will be attained. A reformation of the transfer law should focus on the inclusion of this
already inherent right of those under juvenile court jurisdiction,
because the vital substance of this right has too long been
relegated to secondary status as a result of the inordinate preoccupation with procedural due process which has often been the
hallmark of modem juvenile justice.
The history of this right has depended almost exclusively
upon the judiciary for its ad hoc expansion and enforcement. It
is currently the subject of a considerable amount of litigation in
the courts, and it is only a matter of time before challenges based
on theories of cruel and unusual punishment, unequal protection
of the law, and denials of procedural and substantive due
process' 98 result in a comprehensive imposition of the right upon
the juvenile courts of this country. This will happen because
legislatures and executives have generally failed to take action
on the issue.
It would therefore be appropriate for the General Assembly
of Kentucky, a state with one of the most progressive rehabilitation
programs for young people in the country, to be the first to grant
such a right of treatment to its youth. It would be especially
fitting since Kentucky is presently working very hard, pursuant
to recent legislative and executive initiatives, to upgrade the entire system of processing and correcting those who violate the
laws of the Commonwealth. The importance of this right needs
the prestige which can be imparted to it by legislative recognition
and formulation, and this will depend on defining it in a way
that the public can both understand and accept. That interest
can not be disregarded, and it will only be served if the right to
treatment for young offenders is grounded on the realistic
capabilities of the state to stand behind the obligation incurred
by establishing such a right. This means that the right must be
amenable to judicial scrutiny and enforcement by executive
agencies. 199
l 98 Comment, 16 ST. Louis U.L.J. 340 (1971).
199 See Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile
Process, 57 GEo. L.J. 848 (1968). Unless necessary precautions are taken to
(Continued on next page)
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8. Since the prosecution will make the motion to transfer, it
should also bear the burden of showing the need for transfer,

as well as the child's inability to be rehabilitated. The child
should be allowed the right of confrontation and cross examination and should be able to put on testimony rebutting that of the
prosecution.
9. A transcript of the transfer hearing should be made to aid
any appellate review that might be necessary.
10. When a transfer of jurisdiction is ordered, it should be

accompanied by a detailed written statement from the judge
setting forth the reasons upon which the transfer was based.
These reasons should show by a preponderance of evidence the

child's inability to be rehabilitated by the court. This could be
required under KRS § 208.190.200
11. The order of transfer should become a final, appealable
order for the purposes of KRS § 208.380(1). A notice of appeal
filed under that statute should stop all further processes of the

criminal law. This would allow the propriety and sufficiency of
the transfer order to be thoroughly tested on appeal before the
processes of the criminal law were invoked against the child.
Once this was done, the child's status in circuit court would be
clearly defined as that of an adult. Appeal should be by a de novo
hearing on the issue of transferability.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

guarantee that the recognition of the right to treatment, the establishment of its
criteria, and the machinery for its enforcement are carefully formulated, public
dissatisfaction and inter-agency bickering may ensue, and one more opportunity for
the law's constructive contribution to social engineering will fail to materialize.
Id. at 885. This is not an argument that professional behavioral scientists should
alone decide what to do with the child and for the child. Id. at 857. That was the
drastic mistake made at the inception of the juvenile court movement when courts
and lawyers left the handling of children to psychologists and social workers.
Neither they nor the legal profession can be proud of the institutional tradition
and disregard of basic rights which arose out of that unguarded surrender of
children's care to the almost dictatorial powers of social service agencies. The
problems of the juvenile court were legal problems then just as they are now, and
neither the legal profession nor the courts can any longer turn their backs on that
reality. Gardner, supra note 10. Courts may determine a need for rehabilitation
by a finding of delinquency, and may hand the child over to an agency so the
child can be helped in that rehabilitation. But the courts must also be ready to
enforce the right to rehabilitation when it is brought to their attention that those
responsible for aiding the child are, in fact, derelict in their duty. Social service
agencies need the strictest sort of monitoring because they are helping people, and,
where children are concerned people who are helpless and defenseless against the
abuses that can be perpetrated on them by the agents of rehabilitation.
200 The necessity of such a statement is set forth in note 146 supra.
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12. No child should be allowed to be transferred and taken
before a grand jury within the same 72 hour period. This would
solve the post-transfer legal entanglements now made possible
because counsel does not have adequate time under present law
to file the notice of appeal before the criminal processes can be
commenced.
13. In all cases, the indictment should be limited to the offense
for which the child was transferred. If the transfer proceeding
follows a probable cause format, any reduction to a lesser charge
after indictment should result in the child being sent back to
juvenile court. There should be no misdemeanors prosecuted
against children sent to circuit court through a transfer hearing
based on probable cause.
These are the minimum considerations and elements that
should go into the reformation of Kentucky's transfer law. This
approach would regularize the proceeding and make it possible
to reach a final, proper determination of the child's status before
he starts his journey through the criminal process.
The increasing availability of specialized resources for the
serious young offender should make it more and more unnecessary
to resort to the use of Kentucky's transfer law. Changes in court
procedures and treatment programs effected by the 1972 juvenile
court legislation have made this possible, and these programs
now need to be buttressed by a strong transfer law which will
guarantee that as many children as possible will be kept within
reach of rehabilitative programs which are among the best in
the country.
The social service agencies of state government will play a
major role in the outcome of many of these developing issues
because, under the structure of Kentucky's juvenile court law,
they bear a paramount responsibility, in partnership with the
courts, for seeing that the right to treatment is guaranteed to
children who come before the juvenile courts. The reorganization
of state government 201 can go a long way toward closing the
201 Governor Wendell H. Ford created the new Department for Human Resources by Executive Order 73-777, August 29, 1973. It merges the old departments of Child Welfare, Economic Security, Health, and Mental Health, as well
as the myriad boards, commissions, and advisory bodies related to those departments. Hopefully, this will have a constructive impact on the juvenile justice
system of Kentucky.
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treatment gaps which have often made the work of juvenile
justice personnel so difficult. If it provides good programs,
there will be less need to turn to the criminal courts. Children
cannot continue to be punished because the state fails to provide
for them. The ultimate parent must shoulder its part of the
responsibility to make juvenile justice work so that the transfer
of children to criminal courts may someday be eliminated altogether.
ADDENDUM
Fortunately, while this article was in the final stages of
preparation for publication, the need for a better transfer procedure was given official recognition by both the Kentucky Court
of Appeals and the Office of the Attorney General. The Court
took a major step forward in the case of Hopson v. Commonwealth202 by demanding adherence to certain specific procedural
formalities found in KRS Chapter 208 and including a requirement
that a dispositional investigation be conducted according to the
provisions of KRS § 208.140(1). That decision marked the first
time that the Court has dealt in any detail with what is essentially
the substantive crux of the whole transfer proceeding.
It is only fair to say, however, that a lot of detail is still needed
to define just what will be acceptable as "sufficient reasons" for
transferring a child to criminal court, but the judicial requirement
of the KRS § 208.140(1) investigation has added a promising new
perspective to the transfer question. 0 3 Hopefully, the Court of
Appeals or the General Assembly will soon give the children and
lower courts of this state an even clearer set of guidelines which
basic principles of the juvenile court
will pay due respect to 2the
04
movement in Kentucky.
(Ky. 1973), No. 73-548, rendered October 26,
S.W.2d
202
1973. Actually the Court had just recently dodged the issue of guidelines for
transfer proceedings a month prior to the Hopson decision. In Baker v. Common(Ky. 1973), No. 73-25 rendered September 28,
- S.W.2d -wealth, 1973, the Court noted that: "We need not here consider what those necessary
steps are because whatever they may be, this record contains nothing to suggest
that any of them were taken." The Court found that Baker had been unlawfully
transferred. Hopson was the second such decision in one month. Perhaps the
issue is becoming ripe enough for a significant pronouncement by the Court.
203 This has been, as the article points out, the required statutory procedure
for many years. However, it has never received such an explicit recognition by
the Court of Appeals.
204 A proposal has been prepared for submission to the 1974 General Assem(Continued on next page)
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The Office of the Attorney General, obviously impressed with
both the Hopson opinion and the increasing volume of appeals
involving defective juvenile court orders, has moved decisively
to provide a clarification of the procedures outlined and implied
by the Hopson decision. On October 31, 1978, just five days after
the Court's decision in Hopson v. Commonwealth, the Attorney
General issued Opinion of the Attorney General 78-762 to all the
county judges and county attorneys of the Commonwealth. He
set forth a step-by-step outline of the correct procedure for transferring jurisdiction from juvenile court and touched directly on
the substance of the proceeding by saying that it should only be
used as a last resort. Hopefully, this excellent opinion will serve
to correct some of the abuses now taking place in many of our
juvenile courts.
It was also during the final days of preparing this article for
publication that the author discovered a recent United States
Supreme Court decision which seems to have considerable impact on the appealability of transfer orders, an issue which is
discussed at length in this article. The holding and discussion of
precedent in Hensley v. Municipal Cout, 20 5 while dealing with
habeas corpus actions in federal court, bear directly on the extent
to which the transferred child is "restrained of his liberty" for
the purposes of an appeal pursuant to KRS § 208.380(1) .2 ° 6 The
Hensley opinion and the numerous related cases it discusses provide a strong argument that the transferred child does have
standing to seek immediate appeal under Kentucky juvenile law.
If this analysis is correct, then the procedural chaos surrounding
the proper appeal of a transfer order should be reduced considerably.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

bly which incorporates all the latest developments in the transfer area. If enacted,

it would give Kentucky the fairest and most comprehensive transfer law of any
state in the country. It would also nearly complete the important work of updat'ng
Kentucky's juvenile code which was begun by the 1972 General Assembly. The
transfer law was bypassed in 1972, and a serious gap was left in the substantial

effort to reform our overall criminal justice system. It cannot be bypassed again
without jeopardizing the integrity of a broad reform to which so many people have
given so much time and effort. Children and the juvenile courts simply cannot
be forgotten.

205
- U.S. , 36 L.Ed.2d 294, 93 S.Ct.
(1973).
206 It would make little difference that the child had been released on bail,
because the provisions of Ky. R. Cai. P. 4.24 place him in very tenuous circumstances and create a condition in which he could be deemed to be "in custody" or
"restrained of his liberty" under both the Hensley decision and in cases cited in
support of that opinion.

